S v Mahlinza

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Beyers AR, Ogilvie Thompson AR en Rumpff AR
• Judgment Date: 17 November 1966
• Citation: 1967 (1) SA 408 (A)
• Hearing Date: 19 September 1966
• Court: Appellate Division

B Rumpff, A.R.:

Julia Mahlinza, 'n Bantoevrou en - moeder, het in die Natalse Provinsiale Afdeling van die Hooggeregshof voor Regter FRIEDMAN tereggestaan op 'n klag van moord van haar seuntjie van ses maande, en C ook op twee klagte van poging tot moord van haar twee ouer kinders. Sy het onskuldig gepleit. Hoewel dit bewys is dat sy haar babaseuntjie gedood het en gepoog het om die ander twee kinders te dood, is sy onskuldig bevind. Op aansoek van die Prokureur-Generaal het die Verhoorhof die volgende regsvrae voorbehou vir oorweging deur hierdie Hof:

'1.

D whether the trial Court, having found that the accused was not criminally responsible for the acts charged against her because at the time she committed them she was suffering from a temporary defect of reason or mind induced by an episode of hysterical dissociation, it should not by reason of the provisions of sec. 182 of Act 56 of 1955 have returned the special verdict or finding provided for by sec. 29 (1) of Act 38 of 1916;

2.

whether, on the facts found by the trial Court to have been proved, the mental condition of the accused at the time she committed the E acts charged against her was such as to render her mentally disordered or defective within the meaning of sec. 29 (1) of Act 38 of 1916.'

Die advokaat wat namens die Staat verskyn het, het aangedui dat hy by 'n uitspraak van hierdie Hof ten gunste van die Staat, geen aansoek doen om enige bevel deur hierdie Hof onder art. 369 (3) van die Strafproseswet nie.

F Die volgende uittreksel uit die uitspraak van die Verhoorregter gee 'n prent van die gebeurtenis wat aanleiding gegee het tot die aanklag teen die beskuldigde:

'It appears that, during the night of the 13th/14th August, 1965, the accused left her hut, taking her three young children, the youngest of whom was a baby aged about six months, with her. She went to a nearby G hut where her parents lived. Her husband, who was sleeping in another hut with another wife, learnt of this and went to her. She told him that she had had a dream and wanted him to slaughter a beast. She appeared to be upset but he managed to pacify her and take her back to her hut. At some time during the early hours of the morning she got up from her bed on the floor of the hut and ran about outside, apparently talking nonsense. She then returned to her hut and entered a room adjoining that H in which she had been sleeping and which is used as a kitchen. She poured some paraffin over firewood in a basin which is used as a stove for cooking purposes, and she then set fire to the wood. Immediately thereafter and before the flames had died down she took off the petticoat she was wearing and placed it on the fire. She then placed the baby and her daughter aged about six years on the fire. Her daughter managed to get away and crept under a bed. The accused then took the other child and placed him on the fire. He also managed to get away. The daughter who had crept under the bed looked out to see what was taking place and was again placed on the fire. She again managed to escape. The accused stood at the door of the kitchen to prevent the children from running away. The baby was burnt to death but the other children escaped with burns and have recovered. When eventually neighbours

Rumpff AR

entered the hut they found the accused lying on the floor of the hut completely naked and clutching the daughter to her. According to one of the persons who found her, the accused appeared to be mentally ill. She was saying a lot of things that could not be understood and appeared to be talking nonsense. The accused was a devoted mother and very fond of A her children, but appears to have had a grievance against her husband because she was suffering badly from syphilis and he made no arrangements to have her medically treated.'

By die verhoor het die beskuldigde nie getuienis afgelê nie. Die distriksgeneesheer van Estcourt, Dr. Fismer, het die beskuldigde op 14 Augustus in die vroeë middag ondersoek en in sy getuienis verklaar hy o.a. die volgende oor wat hy bevind het:

B 'She was laughing and generally was very rowdy. Her mood and behaviour was out of line with the injuries sustained by her children. She could not give an account of herself or of her behaviour; she was disorientated and she had no insight into her condition. She had evidence of scorching of her hands, on the left hand mainly at the back and on the right hand mainly of the palm. I recommended that this woman be detained for 2 weeks for observation.

FRIEDMAN, J.: Doctor would you say that at the time of your examination C of her on 14th August that she was mentally disordered or defective in terms of the Mental Disorders Act? - Yes, yes she was.'

Hy het haar ook op die 17de, 19de en 26ste Augustus gesien, en bevind dat sy by daardie geleenthede rekenskap van haarself kon gee. Op daardie geleenthede het hy ook geen geestesversteuring by haar aangetref nie.

D 'n Psigiater, Dr. Boyd, assistent mediese superintendent van Town Hill hospitaal, Pietermaritzburg, het verklaar dat die beskuldigde onder observasie in die hospitaal was vanaf 6 Januarie 1966 tot die dag voor die verhoor, nl. 17 Mei 1966. Hy het aan die hand van 'n verslag deur hom opgestel, gedateer 3 Februarie, o.a. die volgende getuienis afgelê:

'I certify with respect to the mental condition of the accused that she E has consistently affirmed that she has no recollection of her actions about the time of the alleged crime. I am satisfied that she is not trying to deceive the Court in saying so. This inability to remember is, in my opinion, an episode of hysterical amnesia, not infrequently encountered in Bantu culture.'

Sy konklusie was soos volg:

'I am satisfied from my observation of the accused and from examination of the record of evidence that the accused was mentally disordered at F the time of the crime . . .'

Na hierdie getuienis was daar geen kruisverhoor deur die advokaat van die verdediging nie, maar die Verhoorregter het sekere vrae gestel en daarna het o.a. die volgende hom afgespeel tussen die advokaat vir die verdediging en Dr. Boyd:

'Do those patients spend the rest of their lives in a mental home or are G they let out? - That is a question of departmental policy in which I have really no authority to state that the present policy is as far as our commissioner is concerned that he is not very sympathetic to discharging patients committed on capital charges, depending on the circumstances of each case.

FRIEDMAN, J. : There could be always a danger in a case . . . (witness intervenes - That is his opinion.

Would you say that such a danger exists in the case of the accused? - H Well in this case it appears to be an isolated incident. There are precipitating factors which led up to this which were not likely to recur.'

Wat betref hierdie getuienis, was daar geen verdere vrae deur die advokate nie, maar die volgende dag is Dr. Boyd teruggeroep en die Verhoorregter het hom weer sekere vrae gestel omdat, soos hy dit aan die getuie gestel het, hy van mening was dat na aanleiding van sekere beslissings hierdie aspek van die geestestoestand van die beskuldigde nie voldoende ondersoek is nie. Die Verhoorregter het daarna gevra of die toestand van die beskuldigde eerder was soos dié van 'n epeleptikus wat

Rumpff AR

gedurende 'n epileptiese aanval onbewustelik handel, as van iemand wat onder 'n geestesversteuring bewustelik handel en daarna aan amnesie ly. Die antwoord was dat die toestand van die beskuldigde 'n toestand was van histeriese dissosiëring wat ontstaan het uit 'n ondraaglike A emosionele spanning, dat sy nie bewus was van wat sy gedoen het nie maar dat sy nie outomaties opgetree het nie soos...