S v Kekane and Others

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Kirk-Cohen J
• Judgment Date: 14 August 1985
• Citation: 1986 (4) SA 466 (W)
• Hearing Date: 13 August 1985
• Court: Witwatersrand Local Division

Kirk-Cohen J:

At the commencement of proceedings yesterday, Mr Swanepoel for the State informed me that he intended to lead evidence of alleged confessions made respectively by accused B Nos 1,2 and 3 to three different magistrates. By agreement, and at the suggestion of counsel for the prosecution and the defence, two issues were argued before me. They also agreed that the three alleged confessions be placed before me, together with typed copies thereof. Exhibits K1 and 2 are the original and a copy of the alleged confession by No 1, L1 and 2, the original and a copy of the alleged confession by No 2 C and M1 and 2 the original and a copy of the alleged confession by No 3.

It is the State's intention to rely on the provisions of s 217 (1) (b) (ii) of Act 51 of 1977, and the following facts are therefore now under consideration:

1.

Was each alleged confession made to a magistrate?

2.

D Was each such alleged confession reduced to writing by the magistrate?

3.

Does it appear from each document that the alleged confession was made by a person whose name corresponds with the name of the accused in question?

4.

E In the one case where an interpreter interpreted, is there a certificate by the interpreter, and does it appear ex facie the document that he interpreted truly, correctly and to the best of his ability?

5.

Does it appear from each document in which each of the alleged confessions is contained, that each such alleged confession was freely and voluntarily made by F such person in his sound and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced thereto?

6.

Ergo, and if 1 to 5 are proved -

(1)

is each document admissible upon its mere production? and

(2)

does the presumption referred to in s 217 (1) (b) (ii) apply?

Point 2 is not disputed - subject to proof of point 1; ie it G is admitted that the statement in each case was reduced to writing by a person, but it must be proved in each case that such person was a magistrate.

Point 3 is common cause; it appears from each of the documents that the statement therein made was made by a person whose name corresponds with the name of the accused, ie exh K contains the H name of No 1, exh L the name of No 2 and exh M the name of No 3.

After initial argument, Mr Browde, who appears for the defence, did not contest point No 4, nor did he contend that it is necessary to identify the interpreter by extrinsic evidence. He conceded, as I understood his argument, that there is sufficient proof from the document itself. I agree that the concession is correct.

I What is in dispute are points No 1 and 5 above and also the conclusion in 6. During the course of his argument Mr Swanepoel stated that he did not pursue his argument in regard to exh M relating to accused No 3; he accepted that he could not rely upon the presumption and that he would be obliged to discharge the onus as it existed prior to the enactment of s 217 (1) (b) J (ii). Thus, this judgment will not deal with exh M, and relates only to the two alleged confessions, exhs K and L.

Kirk-Cohen J

The first issue before me arises under point 1, namely whether it is necessary to produce viva voce evidence that the persons before whom the statements Were made were duly appointed magistrates.

The second issue is whether the sine qua non under s 217 (1) (b) (ii) has been proved, ie that it appears from the documents in which the alleged confessions are contained that the said B confessions were made freely and voluntarily by the persons in question, in their sound and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced thereto.

I deal now with the first issue. In S v Yolelo1981 (1) SA 1002 (A) the Appellate Division considered the provisions of s 219A (1) of the Act, which contains similar provisions in regard to C the issue now to be discussed. At 1009D the Appeal Court pointed out that the creation of a presumption is a complete innovation. At 1009D VAN HEERDEN AJA said the following:

"Die voorbehoudsbepaling is egter 'n volledige innovasie. Betreffende erkennings aan 'n landdros gedoen en deur hom op skrif gestel en erkennings in die aanwesigheid van 'n landdros D bevestig en op skrif gestel (hierna kortweg erkennings aan 'n landdros genoem), wysig die voorhoudsbepaling die bewysreëls wat gegeld het tot art 219A in 1979 in die Strafproseswet ingevoeg is. Eerstens maak die voorhoudsbepaling voorsiening vir die blote inhandiging van 'n dokument waarin sodanige erkenning vervat is mits:

(1)

dit uit die dokument blyk dat die erkenning gemaak is deur ieman wie se naam ooreenstem met dié van die persoon teen E wie die erkenning aangewend kan word...

Tweedens skep para (b) 'n vermoede dat die erkenning ongedwonge gemaak is. Hierdie vermoede kan deur bewys op 'n oorwig van waarskynlikhede weerlê word..."

With that innovation it is therefore clear that the prior situation, where the magistrate in question and the interpreter ex necessitate had to be called, was altered - see Yolelo's F case at 1009E - H. At 1009 in fine the judgment proceeds:

"Die Wetgewer het waarskynlik beoog om aanvanklik lewering van sodanige bewys onnodig te maak. Dit is egter nie duidelik in hoeverre die Wetgewer daarin geslaag het om in art 219A aan die toegeskryfde bedoeling uiting te gee. Volgens die voorhoudsbepaling is slegs 'n erkenning aan 'n landdros by blote voorlegging van die betrokke dokument as getuienis G toelaatbaar (mits, natuurlik, die dokument aan bogenoemde twee vereistes voldoen). Daar is sekerlik iets te sê vir die standpunt dat, alvorens blote voorlegging van die dokument ter sprake kom, bewys moet word dat die erkenning inderdaad aan 'n landdros gemaak is... Vir doeleindes van die onderhawige appèl is dit egter onnodig en, aangesien geen desbetreffende betoë aangehoor is nie, ook onwenslik om oor die geopperde H onsekerhede uitsluitsel te gee."

Thus it is apparent that the object of the Legislature was to render unnecessary the tendering of the evidence of the magistrate and the interpreter in question. There is a definite indication in this judgment that it is a sine qua non that it be proved that the statement was made to a magistrate. The I Appellate Division did not decide, nor suggest, that this evidence and proof should be by way of viva voce evidence of the de cuius, the magistrate in question or by other viva voce evidence; the judgment postulates that the necessary fact be proved by admissible evidence.

In S v Dhlamini en Andere1981 (3) SA 1105 (W) ACKERMANN J also dealt with s 219A. Considering whether it was necessary to prove that an admission had been made to a magistrate, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that it had to be so J proved, and at 1111H he said the following:

Kirk-Cohen J

A "Die bewys hiervan is 'n voorvereiste vir die inwerkingtreding van die regsgevolge van die voorhoudsbepalings (a) en (b), en die artikel self maak geen besondere voorsiening vir die bewys van hierdie vereistes nie. Gevolglik sou die bewys dan op die gewone manier moes geskied, òf deur die landdros self, òf deur iemand anders wat kan bewys dat hy 'n landdros was."

The Situation There under Consideration Is Also Applicable to S 217 (1) (B). B In terms of the above judgments it is a sine qua non to the coming into operation of subparas (a) and (b) of ss (1) of s 217 that this fact be established; at 1112E of the latter judgment ACKERMANN J said:

"Na my mening vereis die bepalings van art 219A (1) dus dat bewys gelewer moet word dat die persoon wat die erkenning afgeneem het 'n landdros is, en hierdie feit kan nie, luidens C die bepalings van die artikel, eenvoudig bewys word deurdat die aanklaer die dokument waarin die erkenning vervat is, inhandig nie."

And then again at 1112G:

"Laastens ontstaan die vraag of die identiteit van die landdros en die tolk bewys kan word deur blote inhandiging van die dokument waarin die erkenning vervat is, sowel as die sertifikaat van die tolk ingevolge die bepalings van art 222 van die Strafproseswet gelees met art 34 van die Wet op Bewyslewering in Siviele Sake (Wet 25 van 1965)."

D ACKERMANN J considered in detail whether the State could rely on s 34 (1) of Act 25 of 1965 and he came to the conclusion that it could not. He held at 1113A:

"Dit is gemeensaak dat die feite van die huidige geval, en spesifiek die verklarings wat hier ter sprake is, nie tuisgebring kan word onder art 34 (1) nie."

E Mr Swanepoel, in my view correctly, accepted the existence of the sine qua non referred to, but submitted that viva voce evidence is not the only manner in which the State can prove the fact that the statements were made to magistrates. He submitted that this could be proved in terms of the provisions of s 231 of Act 51 of 1977 which provides:

"Any document -

(a)

F which purports to bear the signature of any person holding a public office; and

(b)

which bears a seal or stamp purporting to be a seal or stamp of the department, office or institution to which such person is attached,

shall, upon the mere production thereof at criminal proceedings, be prima facie proof that such person signed such document."

For the purposes of this argument counsel conceded, and it is G common cause, that the contents of exhs K and L, if admitted, would amount to confessions. In Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 3rd ed by Hiemstra, and more particularly in the third Cumulative Supplement (1985), the author says the following of the judgment in Dhlamini's case, at 53:

"Moet daar bewys wees dat die oënskynlike landdros en die oënskynlike tolk werklik onderskeidelik 'n landdros en 'n tolk H is? In S v Yolelo... word gemeen dat daar sekerlik iets te sê'is vir so 'n standpunt, en in Dhlamini se saak op 1112G word definitief bevind dat daar bewys gelewer moet word dat die persoon wat die erkenning afgeneem het, werklik 'n landdros is en dat die oënskynlike...