S v Chretien

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judgment Date: 24 November 1980
• Citation: 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A)

S v Chretien
1981 (1) SA 1097 (A)

1981 (1) SA p1097

Citation	1981 (1) SA 1097 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Rumpff HR, Jansen AR, Miller AR, Joubert AR en Van Heerden Wn AR
Heard	September 15, 1980
Judgment	November 24, 1980

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

H Strafreg — Persone, aanspreeklikheid van — Dronkenskap — Wanneer 'n besope persoon toerekeningsvatbaar is.

Headnote : Kopnota

Wanneer 'n persoon, wat 'n gevolghandeling pleeg, so besope is dat hy nie besef nie dat wat hy doen ongeoorloof is, of dat sy inhibisies wesenlik verkrummel het, kan hy as ontoerekeningsvatbaar beskou word. Is daar 'n redelike twyfel behoort die beskuldigde die voordeel daarvan te kry.

Iemand wat papdronk is en wat onbewus is van wat hy doen is nie aanspreeklik nie omdat 'n spierbeweging in dié toestand gedoen nie 'n strafregtelike handeling is nie. Indien iemand 'n handeling verrig (meer as 'n onwillekeurige spierbeweging) maar so besope is dat hy nie besef wat hy doen nie of dat hy die ongeoorloofheid van sy handeling nie besef nie, is hy nie toerekeningsvatbaar nie. 'n Hof sal alleen op grond van getuienis wat dit regverdig tot die konklusie, of redelike twyfel, kom dat wanneer iemand inderdaad 'n handeling (of omissie) begaan het wat 'n misdaad is, hy dermate besope was dat hy nie toerekeningsvatbaar is nie.

Die beslissing in die Durban en Kus Plaaslike Afdeling in S v Chretien 1979 (4) SA 871 bevestig.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Criminal law — Persons, liability of — Intoxication — When an intoxicated person is criminally responsible.

1981 (1) SA p1098

Headnote : Kopnota

Whenever a person who commits an act is so drunk that he does not realise that what he has done was unlawful or that his inhibitions have substantially disintegrated, he can be regarded as not being criminally responsible. If there is a reasonable doubt, the accused ought to be given the benefit thereof.

Someone who is dead drunk and is not conscious of what he is doing is not liable because a muscular movement which is done in this condition is not a criminal act. If someone does an act (more than an involuntarily muscular movement) but is so drunk that he does not realise what he is doing or that he does not appreciate the unlawfulness of his act, he is not criminally responsible. A court will only come to the conclusion, or have a reasonable doubt, on the ground of evidence which justifies it, that, when someone indeed commits an act (or omission) which is an offence, he was intoxicated to such an extent that he was not criminally responsible.

The decision in the Durban and Coast Local Division in S v Chretien 1979 (4) SA 871 confirmed. C

Case Information

Regsvraag voorbehou in die Durban en Kus Plaaslike Afdeling (FRIEDMAN R). Die aard van die regsvraag blyk uit die uitspraak van RUMPFF HR.

H C Honck namens die appellant (die Staat): Betreffende die onskuldigbevindings op die vyf aanklagte van poging to moord het die D geleerde Regter regtens fouteer deur nie die beginsels neergelê in S v Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201 na te volg nie. Die onderhawige saak is nie van S v Johnson (supra) te onderskei op die gronde soos deur die Hof uiteengesit nie. Daar is geen spesifieke aanduiding in die gerapporteerde verslag van E die saak dat die beskuldigde nie van moord nie maar van strafbare manslag aangekla was. Verder is die hele posisie met betrekking tot die effek van vrywillige dronkenskap wat nie geesteskrankheid tot gevolg het nie, in hierdie saak uiteengesit. Sien Burchell en Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure band 1 te 228 - 234; S v Johnson 1970 (3) SA 535. Aangesien die beskuldigde in 'n toestand van vrywillige dronkenskap verkeer het tydens die uitvoering van sy dade is die Hof a quo F gebonde aan die beslissing in S v Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201. 'n Belangrike beginsel wat in S v Johnson (supra) neergelê is, is dat vrywillige dronkenskap wat geen geesteskrankheid tot gevolg het nie, geen verskoning vir 'n misdaad bied nie. Dit geld ook in gevalle waar 'n beskuldigde nie G willoos dronk is nie. Sien S v Johnson (supra te 205D); Burchell en Hunt (supra te 229); R v Bourke 1916 TPD 303. Die vryspraak op die vyf aanklagte van poging tot moord is teenstrydig met

1981 (1) SA p1099

bogenoemde beginsel. Die aanklagte van poging tot moord impliseer noodwendig die element van 'n bepaalde opset, nl die bedoeling om die dood te veroorsaak. Die beskuldigde se dronkenskap kan hoogstens die A aanwesigheid van die bepaalde opset weerlê. Sien S v V 1979 (2) SA 656; S v Jassane 1973 (4) SA te 664. 'n Soortgelyke benadering is ook gevolg in die onderstaande sake alhoewel die aanklagte telkens aanranding met die doel om ernstig te beseer, was: S v Johnson 1970 (3) SA 535; S v Tsotsotso B 1976 (1) SA 364; S v Smous 1979 (1) PH H56. In elke geval is die beskuldigde aan gewone aanranding skuldig bevind in navolging van S v Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201. Aangesien die beskuldigde vrygespreek is op die vyf aanklagte van poging tot moord enkel as gevolg daarvan dat hy onder die invloed van drank was, staan die uitspraak in konflik met die beginsel in S v Johnson (AA) neergelê en wat bindend op die Hof a quo was. Die C skuldigbevinding aan strafbare manslag was korrek maar op die aanklagte van poging tot moord die korrekte uitspraak 'n skuldigbevinding aan gewone aanrandings moes gewees het. Sien art 258 (e) van Wet 51 van 1977 soos gewysig.

G G Lotz namens die respondent: In order to illustrate the fallacy of the D State's contentions it is necessary to investigate the basic tenets for criminal liability in our law. The rule actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is firmly established in our law. See R v H 1944 AD at 125. The rule requires, in addition to an unlawful physical condition (actus reus), an unlawful mental condition (mens rea). See Burchell and Hunt South E African Criminal Law and Procedure vol 1 at 110; R v Wallendorf 1926 AD at 394; ⅔ v Mtshiza 1970 (3) SA at 752. Essential for the existence of mens rea is that the accused must possess legal capacity to commit the crime charged. See Burchell and Hunt (loc cit at 184); R v Ngobese 1936 AD at 300; R v Pethla 1956 (4) SA at 608, 612; S v Johnson 1969 (1) SA at 211. Contrary to the above basic tenets for criminal liability our Courts F have by way of anomaly laid down the rule that involuntary (unconscious, automatic) muscular movements can lead to criminal liability if the involuntariness (unconsciousness, automatism) was caused by a voluntary consumption of liquor. See R v Fowlie 1906 TS 505; R v Bourke 1916 TPD 303; S v Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201.

Adverting to the State's contention that the Court a quo should have G found the accused guilty of common assault, this is based on a misconception of the law for the following reasons: Assault consists in unlawfully and intentionally: (i) applying force to the person of another; or (ii) inspiring a belief in such a person that force is immediately to be applied to him. See Burchell and Hunt (loc cit at 429). Subjective mens rea in the sense of actual or legal intention must be proved. See R H v Nkosi 1928 AD at 489 - 490; R v Kumalo 1952 (1) SA at 387 - 391. The test for legal intention in cases of assault is, did the accused foresee the possibility that his conduct might involve either the direct or indirect application of force to the complainant. Mens rea comprising culpa cannot constitute sufficient mens rea for attempted murder, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm or assault.

The principles enunciated in S v Johnson (supra) apply to cases where the accused is absolutely incapable of forming any mens rea in

1981 (1) SA p1100

consequence of a state of intoxication or over-indulgence in drugs, ie where he in a state of unconsciousness or automatism. See S v V 1979 (2) A SA at 664G - H. In casu the accused was capable of forming an intention and did in fact form an intention. S v Tsotso 1976 (1) SA 364; S v Johnson 1970 (3) SA 535; S v Smous 1979 (1) PH H56; R v Fowlie (supra); R v Bourke (supra); R v Holliday 1924 AD 250; R v Ngobese 1926 AD 296; R v Pethla 1956 (4) SA 605; S v Jassane 1973 (4) SA 658. Should it be found that the B ratio of S v Johnson (supra) is of application in this matter, then Johnson's case was wrongly decided and should not be followed. This submission is based on the following: The judgment in Johnson's case does not accord with the basic tenets for criminal liability, in particular the rule actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The judgment re-introduces C the doctrine of versari in re illicita which is in conflict with S v Van der Mescht 1962 (1) SA 521 and S v Bernardus 1965 (3) SA 287. See further S v Johnson 1970 (3) SA 353; S v Jassane (supra); J B Thom "The Effects of Intoxication as Defence in Criminal Law" 1963 SALJ 356; T W Bennett "Alcohol, Drugs and Criminal Law" (1973) 90 SALJ 69; Horwood "Drunkenness and Specific Intent in Criminal Law" (1937) 54 SALJ at 456; J P Verloren D van Themaat THRHR 1937 at 291; Van der Horst "Responsa Meridiana " 1969 at 38. Johnson's case wrongly re-establishes the existence of the nebulous concept of "specific intent" in our law, a concept which WESSELS J in R v Bourke (supra at 307) accepted did not form part of our law. See Paine (1974) 91 SALJ at 485; De Wet and Swanepoel Strafreg at 120 - 127.

E In Nederland word die vraag of vrywillige drankinname (die geval van die actio libera in causa uitgesluit) as verweer kan geld in die strafreg, behandel in art 37 van die Wetboek van Strafrecht. Alhoewel hierdie wetsbepaling in beginsel 'n persoon behoort te vrywaar onder omstandighede waar sy geestesvermoëns so deur drank aangetas is dat hy nie weet wat hy F doen nie (vgl bv "Die Memorie van Toelichting tot Wetboek", aangehaal deur Noyon en Langemeijer Het Wetboek van Strafrecht te 197), is dit nie die geval in die praktyk nie. (Vlg Van Hattum Hand-en-Leerboek...