S v Barnard

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1986 (3) SA 1 (A)

S v Barnard
1986 (3) SA 1 (A)

1986 (3) SA p1

Citation	1986 (3) SA 1 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Jansen AR, Van Heerden AR en Nestadt Wn AR
Heard	March 17, 1986
Judgment	March 24, 1986

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde A

Strafproses — Arrestasie — Artikel 49 (2) van Wet 51 van 1977 — Deur gemagtigde persoon as gevolg van vermoedelike pleging van misdryf genoem in Bylae 1 tot die Wet, wat lei tot B doodslag van verdagte persoon — Vereistes waaraan voldoen moet word vir doodslag om regmatig te wees in terme van art 49 (2) — Vereistes van art 49 (1) dat verdagte moet vlug wanneer dit vir hom duidelik is dat poging gedoen word om hom in hegtenis te neem, ook van toepassing vir doeleindes van art C 49 (2).

Headnote : Kopnota

Die vereiste van art 49 (1) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 in die geval van die gebruik van geweld deur die arresteerder waar 'n persoon gearresteer staan te word op 'n in Bylae 1 genoemde misdryf en probeer om te vlug, dat laasgenoemde moet vlug wanneer dit duidelik is dat 'n poging gedoen word om hom in hegtenis te neem, is ook van toepassing vir die doeleindes van art 49 (2), wat die vereistes vir straffelose doding in so D 'n situasie neerlê. Hierdie standpunt is alreeds in die minderheidsuitspraak in Macu v Du Toit en 'n Ander 1983 (4) SA 629 (A) ingeneem. In hierdie saak is daar beslis (in beide die minderheids-en die meerderheidsuitsprake) dat die sinsnede in art 49 (1) (b) "vlug wanneer dit duidelik is dat 'n poging gedoen word om hom in hegtenis te neem", meebring dat dit vir die persoon wat gearresteer staan te word duidelik moet wees E dat die gemagtigde persoon poog om hom te arresteer. Hy moet dan vlug met die opset om die poging te fnuik. Indien dié vereistes nie by art 49 (2) betrek sou word nie, sou dit tot die onhoudbare resultaat lei dat mindere vereistes vir regverdiging van doodslag geld as vir, sê, 'n ligte graad van verwonding binne die raamwerk van art 49 (1).

Appellant, 'n lid van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie, is aangekla van moord maar skuldig bevind aan strafbare manslag in 'n Provinsiale Afdeling en dienooreenkomstig gevonnis. Dit het uit die getuienis geblyk dat die appellant in die

1986 (3) SA p2

A oggend-ure van die betrokke dag van die voorval in beheer van 'n voertuig met 'n tweerigting radio op patrolliediens was en in uniform gekleed was, toe hy per radio meegedeel is dat skote by die Hooggeregshofgebou afgevuur is. Daar was kort vantevore 'n aanval op die gebou deur terroriste geloods en die polisie was gewaarsku dat hulle nog aanslagte op hofgeboue te wagte kan wees. Appellant het as gevolg van hierdie berig na die Hofgebou B gery waar hy knalgeluide hoor weergalm het en 'n bakkie in die rigting van die Hof sien beweeg het. Die knalgeluide het voortgeduur en appellant het gemeen dat daar terroriste in die bakkie was wat geweerskote in die rigting van die Hof afgevuur het. Appellant, wat intussen uit sy voertuig geklim het, het vier skote na die bande van die bewegende bakkie gevuur, en toe laasgenoemde nie tot stilstand kom nie, het hy na die bestuurder gemik, 'n aantal skote afgevuur en hom noodlottig C verwond. Nòg die oorledene nòg sy passasier het 'n vuurwapen by hulle gehad in die bakkie - die knalgeluide wat appellant gehoor het, was die terugploffings van oorledene se bakkie, die veroorsaking waarvan oorledene kort voor die voorval aangeleer het en besig was, op dié noodlottige oggend, om aan sy passasier te demonstreer. By sy verhoor het appellant hom beroep op die bepalings van art 49 (2) van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977. Die Verhoorhof het bevind dat die D Staat hom van die bewyslas gekwyt het dat die doodslag nie weens die bepalings van art 49 (2) geregverdig was nie, maar dat wederregtelikheidsbewussyn by die appellant ontbreek het. Op appèl, en met inagneming van die bogenoemde beginsel aangaande die verband tussen art 49 (1) en 49 (2), het die Hof die vereistes van art 49 (2) vir die doeleindes van die onderhawige appèl getabuleer as synde (a) die appellant moes die insittendes redelikerwyse van die pleging van die betrokke E misdryf, nl terrorisme verdink het; (b) die oorledene en sy passasier moes in hegtenis geneem staan te gewees het; (c) die oorledene moes bewus gewees het van 'n voorneme van die appellant, wat dus kenbaar gemaak moes gewees het, om hom in hegtenis te neem; (d) die oorledene moes met daardie bewussyn gevlug het, dws gepoog het om inhegtenisneming te ontduik deur ontvlugting en (e) ten einde uiteindelike ontvlugting te verhoed, moes daar geen uitweg gewees het anders as om die oorledene te dood nie. Die Hof het op die feite beslis dat die F appellant nie bewys het dat vereistes (c) en (d) aanwesig was of dat hy redelikerwys gemeen het dat dit wel die geval was nie. Appèl afgewys.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Criminal procedure — Arrest — Section 49 (2) of Act 51 of 1977 — By authorised person as result of suspected commission of offence listed in Schedule 1 to the Act, which leads to killing of suspect — Requirements to be complied G with for homicide to be justifiable in terms of s 49 (2) — Requirement of s 49 (1) that suspect must flee when it is clear to him that an attempt is being made to arrest him, also applicable for purposes of s 49 (2).

Headnote : Kopnota

The requirement of s 49 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, in the case of the use of force by an arrestor where a person is about to be arrested for a Schedule 1 offence and H tries to escape, that the latter must flee when it is clear to him that an attempt is being made to arrest him, is also applicable for the purposes of s 49 (2) which lays down the requirements for justifiable homicide in such a situation. This point of view has already been stated in the minority judgment in Macu v Du Toit en 'n Ander 1983 (4) SA 629 (A). In that case it was held (in both the majority and minority judgments) that the phrase in s 49 (1) (b) "flees when it is clear that an I attempt to arrest him has been made", requires that it must be clear to the person on the point of being arrested that the authorised person is attempting to arrest him. He must then flee with the intention of foiling such attempt. Should these requirements not be read into s 49 (2), it would lead to the untenable result that lesser requirements would be laid down for the justification of homicide than for, say, a slight degree of wounding within the framework of s 49 (1).

Appellant, a member of the South African Police, was charged with murder but convicted of culpable homicide in a Provincial J Division and sentenced accordingly. It had appeared from the evidence that the appellant had, in the

1986 (3) SA p3

early hours of the morning of the particular day of the A incident, been on patrol duty in charge of a vehicle equipped with a two-way radio and dressed in uniform, when he was informed by radio that shots had been fired in the vicinity of the Supreme Court building. An attack on the building had been launched by terrorists shortly before and the police had been warned that they could expect more attacks on court buildings. The appellant, acting on this information, drove to the Court B building where he heard explosive noises reverberating and saw a "bakkie" (a small truck) moving in the direction of the Court. The explosive sounds continued and appellant was of the opinion that there were terrorists inside the "bakkie" who were firing gunshots in the direction of the Court. The appellant, who had in the meantime got out of his vehicle, fired four shots at the tyres of the moving "bakkie" and, when the latter failed to come to a halt, he aimed at the driver, fired a number of shots and fatally wounded him. Neither the deceased C nor his passenger had been in possession of a firearm in the bakkie - the explosive noises which appellant had heard, had been the back-firing of the deceased's bakkie, which phenomenon the accused had only shortly before the incident learned to produce with his vehicle and which he had been demonstrating to his passenger on that fatal morning. At his trial, the appellant relied on the provisions of s 49 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The trial Court had found that the D State had discharged the onus of proving that the homicide was not justifiable in terms of the provisions of s 49 (2), but that the appellant had lacked knowledge of unlawfulness. On appeal, and taking into consideration the abovementioned principle regarding the relationship between s 49 (1) and 49 (2), the Court listed the requirements of s 49 (2) for the purposes of the present appeal as being (a) that the appellant must have reasonably suspected the occupants of the vehicle of the commission of the relevant offence, viz terrorism; (b) the E deceased and his passenger must have been on the point of being arrested; (c) the deceased must have been aware of an intention of the appellant, which must therefore have been made known, to arrest him; (d) the deceased must have fled with that knowledge, ie endeavoured to avoid arrest by escaping and (e) there must have been no other way of preventing the eventual escape than killing of the deceased. The Court held on the F facts that the appellant had not proved that requirements (c) and (d) had been complied with or that he had reasonably thought such to be the case. Appeal dismissed.

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n skuldigbevinding in die Natalse Provinsiale Afdeling (NIENABER R). Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van VAN HEERDEN AR.

J H Combrink SC (bygestaan deur J P van Zuydam) namens die appellant het na die volgende gesag verwys: S v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369; R v Britz 1949 (3) SA 293 (A); R v Koning 1953 (3) SA 220 (T); R v Labuschagne 1960 (1) SA 632 (A); R v Van Heerden 1958 (3) SA 150 (T); Sambo v Milns 1973 (4) SA 312 (T); S v Purcell-Gilpin 1971 (3) SA 548 (RA); S v Nell 1967 (4) SA 489 (SWA) H ...