Royal Salt Pans v Laubscher and Another

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1953 (4) SA 398 (A)

Royal Salt Pans v Laubscher and Another
1953 (4) SA 398 (A)

1953 (4) SA p398

Citation	1953 (4) SA 398 (A)
Court	Appellate Division
Judge	Centlivres CJ, Greenberg JA, Schreiner JA, Hoexter JA and De Beer AJA
Heard	September 11, 1953
Judgment	September 18, 1953

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde E

Landlord and tenant — Rents Act — Lease — What constitutes in terms of Act 43 of 1950 — 'Lease' of salt pan — Contract providing for payments primarily for right to take salt from the pan. F — 'Rent' as defined is a payment primarily for use and occupation — Provision for payment not amounting to rent — Contract not a lease in terms of Act — Lessees not entitled to protection of Act on termination of contract — Quaere: Whether the salt pan could be regarded as 'business premises' as defined in section 1.

Headnote : Kopnota

G In terms of a contract it was provided that the lessor let to the lessee a certain salt pan situate on a certain farm on the following conditions: '(a) the lease shall be for a period of ten years as from 23rd February, 1943; (b) the rental shall be the sum of £15 for the first year payable in advance, receipt whereof is acknowledged by the lessor, and thereafter £75 annually payable in advance within eight days H reckoned as from the 23rd February in each and every year; (c) the lessees have the right to mine the salt pan for their own purposes, to take out the salt and remove it for their own account, and the right of ingress and egress to the salt pan at all time is granted to the lessees and their servants and equipment, and they have the right to use' a specified area 'for packing and conveying the salt; (d) the lessees have the right to the use of the water out of the well on the farm . . .'. On the termination of the contract the lessor had succeeded in obtaining an order of ejectment against the lessees who sought to rely on the provisions of the Rents Act 43 of 1950. In an appeal,

1953 (4) SA p399

Held, that the contract could be held to be a lease within the meaning of the Act only if the payment stipulated for therein was rent as defined in section 1 (x) of the Act.

Held, further, that 'rent' as defined by the Act was a payment made primarily for the use and occupation of premises, whereas in the contract the alleged rent was primarily a payment for the right to take salt from the pan.

A Held, further, that the words 'use and occupation' in the definition of rent should not be given an extended meaning in the present case to include the right of removing salt from the pan.

Held, therefore, that the payment which appellants were obliged to make in terms of the contract was not 'rent' as defined in the Act; accordingly that appellants were not entitled to the protection accorded to a lessee in the Act.

B Quaere: Whether the salt pan could be regarded as 'business premises' as defined in section 1 of the Act.

The decision of the Cape Provincial Division in Laubscher and Another v Levy and Another, 1953 (2) SA 403, confirmed but reasons varied. C

Case Information

Appeal from a decision in the Cape Provincial Division. (DE VILLIERS, J.P. and VAN WINSEN, J.). The facts appear from the judgment of HOEXTER, J.A.

B. Lang, Q.C., for the appellant: The contract between the parties is one of lease. The term 'lease' is not defined in sec. 22 (1), nor in the D definition section, sec. 1, of Act 53 of 1951. It is obviously used in its legal sense and must therefore receive the connotation which it has at Common Law; see Uitenhage Divisional Council v Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1944 E.D.L. at p. 6, Steyn, Uitleg van Wette (2nd. ed., pp. 92 - 3). As to when a contract of lease comes into existence and E its essential characteristics, see de Jager v Sisana, 1930 AD at p. 81; Kessler v Krogmann, 1908 T.S. at p. 297; Lee & Honoré, Law of Obligations (para. 368); Neebe v Registrar of Mining Rights, 1902 T.S. at pp. 81, 86; Ex parte Lanham's Executors, 1908 T.S. at p. 331; F Uitenhage Divisional Council case, supra at p. 7; Botha and Another v Soocher, 1941 T.P.D. at p. 246. Even if there is a consumption of portion of the res, that was a right specially conferred and such consumption is still compatible with the contract being a lease. It is only where it is not certain whether the contract is a lease or not that G the presence of this right of consumption may be regarded as indicative of the contract not being one of lease; see Soocher's case supra at p. 247. In any event there can be no appropriation of the substance of the res if there is a process of natural replenishment going on all the time; cf. Lanham's Executors' case, supra at p. 331. The brine is analogous to subterranean water on a farm. It is a product of the soil H i.e. a fruit of the soil which the lessee is entitled to gather; cf. Income Tax Case No. 713, 1952 (2) P.H. Tax cases, p. 45. The term 'rent' is not defined in sec. 22 (1) and as there is no contrary indication in the context it must bear the meaning assigned by sec. 1 (x); see Myaka v Havemann and Another, 1948 (3) SA at p. 457. Even assuming that the yearly sum payable under the contract is not only for the use and occupation of the salt pan but also for the

1953 (4) SA p400

right of utilising a portion of the farm and is therefore a composite rent, it is nevertheless rent within the meaning of that term in sec. 1 (x) and (xii) for the term covers 'any privilege, amenity or facility' A accorded to the lessee. The salt pan, though vacant land, is 'business premises' within the meaning of sec. 1 (i) of Act 43 of 1950. Beyond excluding the categories mentioned in sec. 1 (i) from its ambit, the term is not otherwise defined. Words and expressions in a statute must be interpreted in their ordinary sense, according to their natural or ordinary meaning and in the light of their context; see Union Government B (Minister of Finance) v Mack, 1917 AD at p. 731; Sigcau v Sigcau, 1914 CPD at p. 344; Venter v Rex, 1907 T.S. at pp. 919 - 21; Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another, 1950 (4) SA at p. 662; Craies, Statute Law (5th ed. at p. 151). Words cannot be taken in vacuo and given their natural or ordinary meaning. Their meaning is not C independent of their context; see Re Bidie, 1949 Ch. 121 referred to in Jaga's case, supra at pp. 663 - 4. Their meaning is to be ascertained by reference to the whole of the Act. The section in which the obscure words occur is first to be considered and then, as a last D resort, the rest of the statute or the scheme or the governing intention must be regarded; see Craies, supra at p. 151. By 'context' is meant not only the language of the rest of the statute, but also its matter, its apparent scope and purpose and, within limits, its background; see Jaga's case, supra at p. 662. The method of approach may E be...