Rethinking the interface between customary law and constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa

Record Numberdejure_v52_n2_a12
AuthorAnthony C. Diala,Bethsheba Kangwa
Published date20 August 2019
Date20 August 2019
DOI10.10520/EJC-17a60c4214
Pages189-206
Interface between customary law and constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa 189
Rethinking the interface between
customary law and constitutionalism in
sub-Saharan Africa
Anthony C Diala
LLB, PGDip, LLM, PhD
Senior Lecturer, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Bethsheba Kangwa
LLB, LLM
Doctoral Candidate, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
SUMMARY
Constitutionalism in sub-Saharan Africa evolved from imperial European
laws, which were imposed on Africa’s agrarian political economies through
legal transplants. Being historical continuities of imperial laws, state laws
have a rule-obsessed approach to law, with its attendant justice delivery
problems. Significantly, colonial legal transplant in Africa was
accompanied by radical socioeconomic changes, whose persistent
patterns of power, philosophy, and conduct are referred to as coloniality of
power. The staggering extent to which coloniality affects the normative
behaviours of Africans demands a reassessment of the status of
indigenous African laws. This paper argues that most indigenous laws have
transformed into customary laws through people’s adaptations to legal,
economic, religious, and globalisation-fuelled changes in intersecting social
fields. It uses content analyses of 26 African Constitutions to assess the
extent to which customary laws are accommodated. Suggesting that these
Constitutions are future common laws, the article offers the foundational
values of indigenous laws as building blocks of constitutionalism and legal
integration in the continent.
1Introduction
Constitutionalism is the idea that governmental authority is conferred
and defined by the people through a fundamental law known as the
Constitution.1 In the Global North, the Constitution reflects the
customary laws of citizens, given that these laws had integrated with
state laws through a long coexistence. However, this integrated legal
system is not the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where mostly oral
indigenous laws enjoyed normative monopoly just over a century ago.2
1 For discussion, see Chesterman “Imposed constitutions, imposed
constitutionalism, and ownership” 2004 Connecticut Law Review 947;
Holmes “Constitutions and constitutionalism” in Rosenfeld & Sajó (eds)
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 189-214.
2 ‘Indigenous laws’ are also referred to as ‘people’s law, folk law, adat law,
traditional law’ and ‘autochthonous law.’ See generally Allot & Woodman
(eds) People’s Law and state law: The Bellagio papers (1985) 24.
How to cite: Diala & Kangwa ‘Rethinking the interface between customary law and constitutionalism in sub-
Saharan Africa’ 2019 De Jure Law Journal 189-206
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2019/v52a12
190 2019 De Jure Law Journal
Here, European laws with industrial backgrounds forcefully displaced
indigenous laws with agrarian backgrounds and entrenched themselves
as the dominant legal order. Significantly, state laws abolished, modified,
and rigidly regulated the application of indigenous laws.3 By so doing, it
coercively changed the normative behaviours of Africans, thereby
birthing what we regard today as customary law. However, the creation
of customary law occurred in the context of dissonance between
indigenous laws and state laws. Nowhere is this dissonance more evident
than in African Constitutions, which, as prime products of imposed
European laws, are the normative faces of state laws. We shall argue that
the creation of customary law resulted from people’s normative
adaptations to the socioeconomic changes brought by colonial rule, of
which the most influential is state laws. We shall demonstrate how these
socioeconomic changes were backed by legislation, stamped by the
courts, and enforced by law enforcement agents. Notably, all these
processes of change were embedded in the phenomenon of legal
transplant.4 Accordingly, to illumine our proposal for rethinking the
interface of customary law and African Constitutions, we need to explain
the significance of legal transplant for the interaction of laws in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Legal transplant, defined here as the movement of rules and legal
institutions from one state to another, may be classified into voluntary,
coercive, and imposed types. It is imposed when the laws and judicial
systems of a foreign state are forced on another state through conquest,
colonialism, and some might add, neo-colonialism.5 Being a product of
conquest, imposed legal transplant is unmindful of differences between
the socio-political environments of the transplanting and recipient states.
Accordingly, it had two consequences for African constitutionalism.
Firstly, it disregarded the free will of African peoples, who were on the
receiving end of European laws and legal systems. Many early
Constitutions in Africa were drafted by elites, who were either influenced
by colonialists, or acquired political power through questionable ways
that need not detain us here.6 Secondly, the invidious ways European
laws displaced African legal orders resemble what Siems described as
“malicious legal transplants.”7 Rather than being an isolated event,
colonial legal transplant in Africa was a comprehensive, self-replicating
phenomenon, which was accompanied by radical socioeconomic
changes that irrevocably affected the education, philosophy, religion,
work, food, and dressing of Africans. In short, it created patterns of
3 Morse & Woodman Indigenous law and the state (1988) 8.
4Watson Legal transplants: An approach to comparative law (1993) 1.
5 Owen “The foreign imposition of domestic institutions” 2002 International
organization 375-409.
6 Even South Africa’s serenaded constitution had little input from the masses.
For debate, see Sparks Tomorrow is another country: The inside story of
South Africa’s negotiated settlement (1995) 63.
7 Siems “Malicious legal transplants” 2018 Legal Studies 105.

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