Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Howie JA, Farlam JA and Mpati JA
• Judgment Date: 15 November 2002
• Citation: 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA)
• Docket Number: 245/2001
• Hearing Date: 19 September 2002
• Counsel: G J M Wright for the appellant, instructed by the Legal Aid Board. E H F le Roux for the State.
• Court: Supreme Court of Appeal

Mpati JA:

[1] The appellant appeals against a sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him for the rape of a 13 year old girl. He stood trial in the regional court sitting at Welkom and was convicted on 6 April 1999. The rape was perpetrated on 23 H September 1998, almost four months after the minimum sentencing provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act) came into force on 1 May 1998. Since the complainant was under the age of 16 years a sentence of imprisonment for life had to be imposed on the appellant (s 51(1)) unless substantial and compelling circumstances existed which justified the imposition of a lesser sentence (s 51(3)). I The regional magistrate accordingly committed the appellant for sentence in the High Court.

[2] On 12 August 1999 Cillie J (in the Orange Free State Provincial Division), having satisfied himself that the appellant's conviction was in order, confirmed it (s 52(2)(b)). No evidence was led before him J

Mpati JA

and after argument was presented by counsel, both in mitigation and aggravation of sentence, Cillie J A concluded that no substantial and compelling circumstances were present. He duly sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life. The learned Judge subsequently (on 26 November 1999) granted the appellant leave to appeal to this Court against the sentence, for the reason that ' 'n ander Hof tot 'n ander bevinding, ten aansien van die vraag of die sogenaamde wesenlike en dringende omstandighede in B die onderhawige geval aanwesig is, kan kom as dít waartoe ekself gekom het'.

[3] In considering the question of the existence or otherwise of substantial and compelling circumstances Cillie J referred to his earlier judgment in S v Shongwe 1999 (2) SACR 220 (O), in which he approved as being correct the interpretation given by Stegmann C J to the concept of 'substantial and compelling' circumstances in S v Mofokeng and Another 1999 (1) SACR 502 (W). In the latter case the learned Judge held that 'for substantial and compelling circumstances to be found, the facts of the particular case must present some circumstance that is so exceptional in its nature, and that so obviously exposes the injustice of the statutorily D prescribed sentence in the particular case, that it can rightly be described as ''compelling'' the conclusion that the imposition of a lesser sentence than that prescribed by Parliament is justified' (at 523c - d). Cillie J accordingly said, in the present matter, 'dat wesenlike en dwingende omstandighede darem iets meer moet wees as die gewone versagtende omstandighede en werklik iets E moet wees wat die oplegging van 'n mindere vonnis inderdaad noodsaak ten einde 'n onreg teenoor die beskuldigde te voorkom'. After a brief reference to the appellant's personal circumstances and the circumstances under which the rape was committed the learned Judge said:

'Ek meen nie dat hierdie 'n geval is waar gesê kan word dat elke regdenkende en ervare vonnisoplegger die oplegging van die F voorgeskrewe vonnis as 'n skokkende onreg teenoor die beskuldigde sal aanvoel nie.'

In this regard Cillie J had in mind what he said in S v Shongwe (supra) that 'indien die wetlik voorgeskrewe vonnis sodanig verskil van die vonnis wat andersins deur 'n ervare en gebalanseerde vonnisoplegger as gepas beskou sou word dat G die oplegging van die wetlik voorgeskrewe vonnis tot 'n skokkende onreg teenoor die beskuldigde sou lei daardie feit wel wesenlik en dwingend die nie-oplegging van die wetlik voorgeskrewe vonnis regverdig'.

[4] In S v Malgas 2001 (2) SACR 469 (SCA) (2001 (1) SA 1222), this Court held that the imposition of the prescribed sentence H need not amount to a shocking injustice ('skokkende onreg') before a departure from it is justified. That such a sentence would be an injustice is enough (para [23]). The suggestion that for circumstances to qualify as substantial and...