Prinsloo v Du Preez, NO

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judgment Date: 30 June 1965
• Citation: 1965 (4) SA 300 (W)

Prinsloo v Du Preez, NO
1965 (4) SA 300 (W)

1965 (4) SA p300

Citation	1965 (4) SA 300 (W)
Court	Witwatersrand Local Division
Judge	Vieyra J
Heard	February 2, 1965
Judgment	June 30, 1965

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde E

Negligence — Action for damages — Joint wrong-doers — Amount accepted in settlement of claim against one wrong-doer — Other wrong-doer now sued for half the damages — Agreement of settlement F ambiguous — Not clear whether discharge under sec. 2 (10) of Act 34 of 1956 or under sec. 2 (13) — Extrinsic evidence admissible.

Headnote : Kopnota

Plaintiff sued the insurer of a motor vehicle which had collided with a municipal ambulance for damages for bodily injury incurred as the result partly of the negligence of the driver of the insured vehicle and partly G of the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. Plaintiff averred that she had suffered damages in the amount of R20,000 and that she had settled her claim against the municipality by accepting an amount of R1,750 and that she was accordingly entitled to claim R10,000 from the defendant. Defendant excepted to the declaration on the ground that the terms of the agreement of settlement between plaintiff and the municipality indicated that the plaintiff had accepted the amount as satisfying and discharging 'all damages . . . resulting from the said bodily injury'.

H Held, that an agreement limiting liability to a specified amount in terms of section 2 (10) of the Apportionment of Damages Act, 34 of 1956, presupposed that the plaintiff did not accept it as a complete discharge of the debt but as a discharge of the joint wrongdoer with whom he had so contracted.

Held, further, however, that the reference 'a sum of money in full settlement of the plaintiff's claim' in section 2 (13) of the Act meant that the plaintiff agreed to accept the amount in discharge of anyone as a result of the delict.

Held, further, as the agreement was ambiguous, it not being clear whether the agreement was made under sub-section (10) or (13), that extrinsic evidence would be admissible at the trial as to the interpretation to be placed on the agreement. Exception accordingly dismissed with costs.

1965 (4) SA p301

Case Information

Exception to a declaration. The nature of the pleadings appears from the reasons for judgment.

W. G. Muller, S.C., for the excipient (defendant).

H. Rothschild, for the respondent (plaintiff).

Cur. adv. vult. A

Postea (June 30th).

Judgment

B Vieyra, J.:

Action was brought by Mrs. Ivy Prinsloo against the liquidator of The Yeoman Insurance Co. Ltd. for payment of compensation in terms of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 29 of 1942, in respect of damages sustained by the plaintiff in a collision between an ambulance belonging to the City Council of Johannesburg and a motor vehicle insured by the aforesaid insurance company in terms of the said statute. C The plaintiff was a passenger in the ambulance, and she alleges she suffered damages in the sum of R20,000, due partly to the negligence of the driver of the insured vehicle and partly to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance.

Para. 8 of the declaration states as follows:

'The plaintiff has settled her claim against the City Council of Johannesburg in respect of the said collision and has released the said D City Council from further liability in respect thereof. The amount paid by the said City Council of Johannesburg to the plaintiff and accepted by her in full settlement of her claim against the said City Council is the sum of R1,750.'

The plaintiff says further that she is accordingly entitled to claim onehalf of...