Minister of Law and Order v Patterson

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Judge: Rabie CJ, Corbett JA, Kotzé JA, Trengove JA and Viljoen JA
• Judgment Date: 02 March 1984
• Citation: 1984 (2) SA 739 (A)
• Hearing Date: 18 November 1983
• Court: Appellate Division

Minister of Law and Order v Patterson
1984 (2) SA 739 (A)

1984 (2) SA p739

Citation	1984 (2) SA 739 (A)
Court	Appellate Division
Judge	Rabie CJ, Corbett JA, Kotzé JA, Trengove JA and Viljoen JA
Heard	November 18, 1983
Judgment	March 2, 1984

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde A

State — Actions against — In magistrate's court — Jurisdiction — Legislature in ss 28 and 29 of Act 32 of 1944 dealt comprehensively with question of jurisdiction of magistrate's courts — Although s 1 of State Liability Act 20 B of 1957 entitles a plaintiff to sue the State in any competent court, the question as to which magistrate's court is competent to entertain a particular suit is to be determined in the light of s 28 of Act 32 of 1944 — The "place of business" of the State, for the purposes of s 28 (1) (a) of Act 32 of 1944 is Pretoria, the "seat of Government of the C Republic" — Act 32 of 1961 s 23 — Action against Minister for damages for alleged assault by a policeman — Assault allegedly committed on plaintiff in Hermanus — Action instituted in Cape town magistrate's court — Latter court not having jurisdiction in terms of s 28 of Act 32 of 1944 — Special plea as to lack of jurisdiction upheld.

Headnote : Kopnota

The Legistlature, in passing ss 28 and 29 of the Magistrates' D courts Act 32 of 1917 - and also ss 28 and 29 of the present Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 - intended to deal comprehensively with the question of the jurisdiction of magistrates' courts. Therefore, as far as civil actions against the State are concerned, s 1 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 and s 28 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 can E properly be read together: s 1 of the State Liability Act entitles the subject to sue the State in any competent court, and the question as to which magistrate's court is competent to entertain any particular suit is to be determined in the light of the provisions of s 28 of the Magistrates' Courts Act.

The majority decision in Du Plessis v Union Government (Minister of Defence) 1916 AD 57, that every magistrate's court in the country is competent to entertain any action against the F State, provided only that the claim in issue is within the limits of the jurisdiction of such court, can no longer be regarded as valid.

The considerations which move the Courts to restrict, for jurisdictional purposes (in particular with reference to s 28 (1) (a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944), the "residence" or "place of business" of a trading corporation to the place where the central management of such corporation is exercised apply with equal, and even greater, force to the case G of the State, considering its vast and country-wide activities. In the case of the State that place is Pretoria, which is, according to s 23 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961, "the seat of Government of the Republic".

The respondent, as plaintiff, had instituted, in the Cape Town magistrate's court, an action for damages for assault against the appellant, as defendant. The alleged assault was committed on the respondent at Hermanus (a different magisterial district H to that of Cape Town) by a member of the South African Police. The appellant raised a special plea to the effect that the magistrate's court in Cape Town had no jurisdiction to hear the action because the respondent's cause of action arose in the area of jurisdiction of the magistrate's court at Hermanus and the appellant, as representative of the Government, did not in that capacity reside or carry on business, within the meaning of s 28 (1) (a) of Act 32 of 1944, in the area of jurisdiction of the magistrate's court in Cape Town. The magistrate dismissed the special plea. An appeal to a Provincial Division failed, it

1984 (2) SA p740

being held that the State, the real defendant in the action, carried on business everywhere in South Africa and could therefore be sued in any magistrate's court in the country, provided only that the claim was one which a magistrate's court was entitled to consider. In a further appeal, leave to appeal to the Appellate Division having been granted,

A Held, that the question whether the respondent was entitled to sue the appellant in the magistrate's court in Cape Town had to be determined by reference to the provisions of s 28 of the Act.

Held, further, that, on the grounds of convenience and in the interests of certainty, a rule similar to that which the Courts apply when determining the forum in which trading corporations or other artificial persons may be sued should be adopted in B determining which magistrate's court has jurisdiction, under s 28 (1) (a), to entertain an action.

Held, further, that the "place of business" of the State is, according to s 23 of Act 32 of 1961, Pretoria.

Held, accordingly, that the special plea should have been upheld. Appeal allowed.

The decision in the Cape Provincial Division in Minister of C Polica v Patterson 1982 (2) SA 494 reversed.

Case Information

Appeal from a decision in the Cape Provincial Division (VAN HEERDEN J and BERMAN AJ), reported at 1982 (2) SA 494. The facts appear from the judgment of RABIE CJ.

W H van Staden for the appellant: In Union Government v Du D Plessis 1916 AD 57 het die Appèlhof art 2 van Wet 1 van 1910 geïnterpreteer en obiter bevind dat die Staat in elke landdroshof in die Unie aangespreek kan word. DE VILLIERS WN AR het dit in 'n minderheidsuitspraak nie aanvaar nie en bevind dat jurisdiksie in die omstandighede in die Kaap beperk was tot die distrik waar die gedingsoorsaak ontstaan het. In Dunning v E Union Government 1932 NPD 700 het die meerderheid bevind dat Union Government v Du Plessis verkerrd beslis is en dat die gemelde bevinding obiter was en dit nie gevolg nie. In Union Government v Hattingh 1934 TPD 315 is bevind dat die voorganger van art 28 van Wet 32 van 1944, te wete art 28 (2) van Wet 32 van 1917 die effek van art 2 van Wet 1 van 1910 vernietig het F en dat die Staat as verweerder in dieselfde posisie is as enige ander persoon. Daar is bevind dat art 28 (2) behels dat die Staat 'n "plek van woning" moet hê en dat die permanente hoofkantoor van 'n betrokke departement wat gedagvaar word so 'n plek is. Artikel 1 van die Wet op Staats aanspreeklikheid 20 van 1957, wat Wet 1 van 1910 vervang het, het in elk geval die G effek van laasgenoemde Wet soos geïnterpreteer in die Du Plessis- saak vernietig aangesien art 1 van Wet 20 van 1957 van art 2 van Wet 1 van 1910 verskil. Uit bogemelde kort oorsig kom dit voor asof die landdros en ook die Hof a quo nie die saak van Hattingh v Union Government toegepas het nie. By die interpretasie van art 28 moet art 2 van Wet 20 van 1957 in gedagte gehou word. Die voorskrifte van die artikel is H klaarblyklik aanwysend. (Sien Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg 2de uitg op 468.) Wat die posisie van die Staat as verweerder in die Hooggeregshof betref, sien Herbstein en Van Winsen Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in SA 3de uitg op 41, waarvolgens enige Afdeling van die Hooggeregshof jurisdiksie het om verrigtinge teen die Staat aan te hoor as die gedingsoorsaak binne die jurisdiksiegebied van die betrokke Hof ontstaan het en waarvolgens die woonplek van die Minister geen rol speel nie. (Sien ook Joubert The Law of South Africa band 11 para 408.) Artikel 28 (2) het die effek

1984 (2) SA p741

van art 2 van Wet 1 van 1910 vernietig en die Staat as verweerder is in dieselfde posisie as enige ander persoon. (Sien Jones en Buckle The Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Court of South Africa 7de uitg band 1 op 35 en 40.) Die eenvoudige vraag wat dan beantwoord moet word is waar die A Minister van Polisie in sy hoedanigheid as gesiteerde van die Staat "woon, besigheid dryf of in diensbetrekking is". Die bedoeling van art 28 (2) is klaarblyklik om die Staat in dieselde posisie as 'n gewone persoon te plaas, nie in 'n swakker posisie nie. Die term "woonplek" kan in sy gewone betekenis slegs gebruik word met betrekking tot natuurlike B persone. 'n Regspersoon se woonplek is die plek waar dit werklik besigheid doen. (Sien Jones en Buckle (op cit op 38 para 9) en sake daar aangehaal.) Die uitdrukking "besigheidsplek" of "woonplek" van die Departement van Justisie moet die hoofkantoor van die Departement in Pretoria beteken. (Sien Ackerman v Union Government 1915 CPD 247 en die C Hattingh- saak.) Die Departement van Justisie is deel van die uitvoerende gesag en nie die wetgewende gesag nie en die feit dat Kaapstad die wetgewende setel is het niks met die saak te make nie. Vir sover dit besigheidsplek betref, 'n regspersoon "besigheid" "dryf" waar sy vernaamste besigheidsplek is en sy vernaamste besigheidsplek is die plek waar die administrasie van die regspersoon behartig word. (Sien Jones en Buckle (op D cit op 39 en sake aangehaal in voetnoot 18 te wete: T W Beckett & Co Ltd v H Kroomer Ltd 1912 AD 324; Sciacero & Co v Central SA Railways 1910 TS op 121; Estate Kootcher v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1941 AD 256).) Die Departement van Justisie se hoof-besigheidsplek is klaarblyklik Pretoria. Vgl ook die posisie van die SAS & H soos uiteengesit in Jones E en Buckle (op cit op 40). (Sien in die algemeen ook Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg 2de uitg op 468.)

Die verhoorlanddros het sy hele uitspraak baseer op domisilie toe hy bevind het dat die Minister van Polisie in beide die "hoofstede" Kaapstad en Pretoria domisilie het. Die feit van die saak is dat domisilie niks met die interpretasie van art 28 F van Wet 32 van 1944 te doen het nie. Die Hof a quo het in die volgende opsigte fouteer: In die saak van Crown Investments Ltd and Others v Department of the Environment [1977] 1 All ER 813, waarop die Hof a quo baie swaar steun, is die woord "business" in die definisie "business tenancy" vir heeltemal ander G doeleindes as die huidige geïnterpreteer. Met die uitleg van...