Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Ehlanzeni District Municipality
| Jurisdiction | South Africa |
| Judge | DT Skosana AJ |
| Court | Gauteng Division, Pretoria |
| Citation | 2020 JDR 1063 (GP) |
| Docket Number | 70680/2013 |
Skosana AJ:
This judgment follows an order of the Full Court of this Division ("the FC") handed down on 14 June 2018 in terms of which my judgment dated 12 April 2016 ("my earlier judgment") was set aside. In my earlier judgment, I had upheld the defendant's special plea that the plaintiff has no locus standi in judicio to claim the pension benefit contributions from the defendant which were allegedly payable to the plaintiff's former employee, Mr Johan Willem Scheepers ("Scheepers").
From the onset, I need to set out my understanding of the reason for the FC to have remitted the matter back to the court a quo to make a decision on the outstanding issues and also to outline what my task is in the present judgment.
The FC, in its judgment, set out from the onset that the appeal was against "the court a quo's finding upholding the respondent's (defendant a quo's) special plea that the appellant (plaintiff a quo) has no locus standi in judicio to claim retirement benefit contributions payable by the appellant to a former member, Johan Willem Scheepers ("Scheepers"), who was previously employed by the predecessor of the respondent and whose employment was terminated on 30 April 1997." [1] The ratio decidendi of the FC is that in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff has locus standi to claim such contributions from the defendant, hence my earlier judgment was set aside [2] .
2020 JDR 1063 p3
Skosana AJ
The FC stated that I had not summarized the evidence led at the trial nor had I made any credibility findings thereon notwithstanding that the parties had led one witness each and therefore it took it upon itself to summarize such evidence for the purposes of the appeal judgment [3] . In my understanding, the FC did not, and could not, make a credibility finding on the testimony of these witnesses. All that the FC did was to make certain observations on the evidence as captured in the transcribed record. I therefore differ with the plaintiff's submission that the findings of the FC on the facts, as set out in paragraph 7.2 to 7.10 of its heads of argument [4] , are binding on me and/or have become res judicata in respect of the outstanding issues. The findings of the FC, in so far as they can be regarded as such, were made solely in relation to the issue of the locus standi and not in relation to the outstanding issues that were remitted back to the court a quo. Otherwise there would be no need to refer the matter back to the court a quo for its decision on the outstanding issues whilst all the evidence relating thereto had already been led and placed before the FC by way of the transcribed record.
In the light of the above, it is my view that, though I may have regard to the observations made by the FC in relation to the outstanding issues on which I am called upon to make a determination, I am not bound thereby nor do such observations constitute res judicata between the parties. The latter submission is also in direct contrast with the FC's ruling that "the matter is referred back to the
2020 JDR 1063 p4
Skosana AJ
court a quo to make a final decision on all the issues still outstanding" [5] . This presupposes that the FC's findings, decision and/or conclusions in relation to all the outstanding issues were not final. As aptly stated in Ascendis Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation & Others [6] :
In essence, the crux of res judicata is that where a cause of action has been litigated to finality between the same parties on the previous occasion, a subsequent attempt to litigate the same cause of action by one party against the other party should not be allowed" [my emphasis].The outstanding issues have not been litigated to finality between the parties. Thus the FC has ordered the court a quo to finalize litigation in respect thereof.
The outstanding issues to be decided by the court a quo are the special plea of prescription raised by the defendant as well as the residual and closely related issue of liability as to whether or not the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the pension benefit contributions.
Having set out the course which I will follow in this judgment, I now proceed to deal with such outstanding issues. As the issue of prescription and the general liability of the defendant are intertwined, I deal with them simultaneously hereunder.
2020 JDR 1063 p5
Skosana AJ
In my respectful view, the evidence adduced in this case serves very little purpose in assisting me to determine the outstanding issues in this matter which is the same view I took in relation to the issue of locus standi. However, for the sake of completeness, I will summarize the evidence which was placed before me through the two respective witnesses and set out hereunder my respectful view and findings thereon
[9] PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS
The plaintiff called one witness, Mrs Mari-Lise Fourie, its principal officer. Her evidence can be summarized as follows:
That the plaintiff is a defined benefit pension fund established in terms of the Pension Fund Act no. 24 of 1956 ("the Pension Fund Act"). The plaintiff provides benefits to its members in the form of a lumpsum gratuity as well as monthly pension fund payouts over the members' lifetime;
That Scheepers is a member of the plaintiff as he was employed by the defendant's predecessor. He remained such a member notwithstanding that his services with the defendant's predecessor were terminated on 30 April 1997. Scheepers' services were terminated with the defendant's predecessor when there was a re-organization and transfer of the ambulance services from such local authority to the provincial administration which has now become the Provincial Department of Health ("the Department of health");
2020 JDR 1063 p6
Skosana AJ
She was adamant that Scheepers' services were terminated by way of retrenchment and that he assumed new employment with the provincial administration on 01 May 1997;
She stated that according to the rules of the plaintiff which were applicable at Scheepers' termination, the defendant's predecessor in title was responsible for payment of the monthly pension contributions as employer to Scheepers until Scheepers reached the age of 65 years, which he will reach in October 2025. The rules that are relevant are rules 35(1) to (3) and 33 of the plaintiff's rules. The employer's liability for monthly contributions to Scheepers was R1 628-52 until he reached 65 years of age which came to a total of R345 952-79;
Scheepers had less than 10 years of service when his services were terminated with the defendant's predecessor on 30 April 1997. She relied heavily on rule 35(3) of the plaintiff's rules to the effect that the liability of the employer to pay for the contributions towards Scheepers continued and Scheepers membership to the plaintiff would not be terminated until all the outstanding monies had been paid...
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