Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach en 'n Ander

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Citation: 1988 (1) SA 318 (A)

Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach en 'n Ander
1988 (1) SA 318 (A)

1988 (1) SA p318

Citation	1988 (1) SA 318 (A)
Court	Appèlafdeling
Judge	Rabie Wn HR, Botha AR, Jacobs AR, Vivier AR en Boshoff Wn AR
Heard	August 27, 1987
Judgment	September 19, 1987

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde H

Verkoop — Van grond — Opsie — Uitoefening van — Wanneer betyds uitgeoefen — Brief van uitoefening op laaste dag vir uitoefening aan I voordeur geheg van woning op perseel deur verkoper gekies as domicilium citandi et executandi — Kies van domicilium citandi et executandi verwys gewoonlik na betekening van prosesstukke in hofverrigtinge tensy kontrak 'n wyer betekenis aan die woorde heg — Geen sodanige aanduidings in huidige kontrak nie — Bepaling in kontrak dat opsie 'uitgeoefen word deur lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die J eienaar...' — Geen aanduidings

1988 (1) SA p319

A dat wyer betekenis aan woorde geheg moes word nie — Woord 'lewering' gebruik in sin van in besit stel — Waar verkoper vier dae vroeër op reis gegaan het en geen aanduiding dat hy uitoefening van opsie selfs nalatiglik verydel het nie is leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling nie van toepassing nie.

Headnote : Kopnota

Kragtens 'n notariële prospekteerkontrak, het die eerste respondent aan B die appellant 'n opsie verleen om sekere eiendomme in die kontrak genoem te koop. Klousule 4.2 van die kontrak het, in verband met die uitoefening van die opsie, soos volg bepaal: 'Die opsie sal skriftelik uitgeoefen word deur lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar tot die effek dat die opsie uitgeoefen word, en wel voor beëindiging van die kontrak....' Klousule 8.2 het bepaal dat die eienaar (eerste respondent) domicilium citandi et executandi by sy plaas C gekies het. Op die laaste dag vir uitoefening van die opsie, het appellant se prokureur, vergesel deur 'n polisie offisier, na eerste respondent se plaas gegaan en die kennisgewing van uitoefening van die opsie aan die voordeur van die woning op die plaas geheg. Die eerste respondent het vier dae vroeër na sy dogter in Natal gegaan en het eers die dag na die laaste dag vir uitoefening van die opsie na sy plaas teruggekeer. In 'n Provinsiale Afdeling het die appellant aansoek gedoen om 'n bevel wat verklaar dat die opsie geldiglik uitgeoefen is en dat D eerste respondent verplig was om die eiendom aan appellant oor te dra. Die aansoek is van die hand gewys. In 'n appèl is dit onder andere namens die appellant aangevoer: (a) met 'n beroep op klousule 8.2, dat hy geregtig was om die opsie uit te oefen deur aflewering van die kennisgewing by die domicilium citandi et executandi, soos gedoen is; (b) dat die woord 'lewering' in klousule 4.2 nie beteken het dat die eerste respondent in besit gestel moes word van die kennisgewing nie; en E (c) dat eerste respondent vir appellant verhinder het om die opsie uit te oefen deur nie beskikbaar te wees om die kennisgewing te ontvang nie en dat, met toepassing van die beginsels van fiktiewe vervulling, die opsie geag moes word vervul te gewees het.

Beslis (per Vivier AR, Botha AR en Jacobs AR samestemmend, Rabie Wn HR en Boshoff Wn AR afwykend), dat die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi sonder meer slegs betrekking het op die betekening van prosesstukke in die loop van 'n regsgeding en in die onderhawige kontrak F was daar geen aanduidings tot die teendeel nie.

Beslis, verder, dat aan die woorde 'lewering aan die eienaar' in klousule 4.2 die betekenis geheg moet word dat eerste respondent in besit van die kennisgewing gestel moes word.

Beslis, verder, dat daar geen ruimte vir toepassing van die leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling in die huidige saak was nie: appellant het nie sy saak op hierdie basis gevoer nie en daar was ook geen aanduiding dat G eerste respondent die uitoefening van die opsie selfs nalatiglik verydel het nie.

Beslis, gevolglik, dat die appèl afgewys moes word.

Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach en 'n Ander 1986 (2) SA 88 (O) bevestig.

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Sale — Of land — Option — Exercise of — When timeously exercised — H Letter exercising option fixed to the front door of the residence on the property chosen by the seller as domicilium citandi et executandi on the last day for the exercise of the option — Choice of domicilium citandi et executandi usually refers to the service of process in legal proceedings unless the contract confers a wider meaning on the words — No such indications in present contract — Provision in contract that the options shall 'be exercised by delivery of a written notice to the owner...' — No indication that wider meaning to be attached to words — I Word 'delivery' used in sense of 'being put in possession of' — Where seller had gone on a journey four days earlier and no indication that he even negligently frustrated the exercise of option, doctrine of fictional fulfilment not applicable.

Headnote : Kopnota

In terms of a notarial prospecting contract, the first respondent had conferred an option on the appellant to purchase certain properties mentioned in the contract. Clause 4.2 of the contract provided, in J connection with the exercise of the option, as follows:

1988 (1) SA p320

'The option shall be exercised in writing by delivery of a written notice to the owner to the effect that the option is exercised, before the termination of the contract....' Clause 8.2 provided that the owner (first respondent) had chosen domicilium citandi et executandi at his farm. On the last day for the exercise of the option, the applicant's attorney, accompanied by a police officer, went to the first respondent's farm and attached the notice of exercise of the option to the front door of the residence on the farm. The first respondent had, four days earlier, gone to visit his daughter in Natal and had returned to his farm only on the day after the last day for the exercise of the option. In an application in a Provincial Division the appellant applied for an order declaring that the option had been validly exercised and that the first respondent was obliged to transfer the property to the appellant. The application was dismissed. In an appeal it was contended inter alia on behalf of the appellant: (a) with reference to clause 8.2, that the appellant was entitled to exercise the option by delivering the notice to the domicilium citandi et executandi as had been done; (b) that the word 'delivery' in clause 4.2 did not mean that the first respondent had to be put in possession of the notice; and (c) that first respondent had hindered the appellant from exercising the option by not being available to receive the notice and that, applying the doctrine of fictional fulfilment, the option was deemed to have been fulfilled.

Held (per Vivier JA, Botha JA and Jacobs JA concurring, Rabie ACJ and D Boshoff AJA dissenting), that the choice of a domicilium citandi et executandi in itself related solely to the service of process in legal proceedings and in the present case there were no indications to the contrary.

Held, further, that the words 'delivery to the owner' in clause 4.2 should be given the meaning that first respondent had to be put in possession of the notice.

Held, further, that there was no room for the application of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment in the present case: the appellant had E not conducted his case on this basis and there was no indication that the first respondent had even negligently frustrated the fulfilment of the option.

Held, accordingly, that the appeal had to be dismissed.

Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach en 'n Ander 1986 (2) SA 88 (O) confirmed.

Case Information

F Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die Oranje-Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling (Smuts R) gerapporteer te 1986 (2) SA 88. Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van Vivier AR.

C Ploos van Amstel namens die appellant: The first respondent was temporarily absent from the farm on 15 May 1985. By that date he had G already been away from the farm for four days, in Pietermaritzburg. First respondent concedes that he left his Black employee at the farm, and he does not dispute that the Black employee was a responsible adult person, apparently in charge of the premises during the temporary absence of the first respondent from such farm. The aforegoing amounts to a situation wherein the first respondent had given tacit or implied H authority to such employee to deal with callers at the property. First respondent's absence at the crucial time suggests that he probably did leave a responsible servant in charge, with authority to act for and on behalf of the first respondent in the receipt of messages or letters or notices or documents or postal articles. It would also fall within the course and scope of the servant's employment by the first respondent. I Van Loggenberg v Sachs 1940 WLD 253; Voet 46.3.4. It follows that the servant was duly authorised, at least by implication or tacitly, to act for and on behalf of first respondent and to receive on behalf of the first respondent, on 15 May 1985, the copy of the notice of exercise of the option. Generally, performance, payment or the like under contract, may be made to the creditor in person, or to his servant or agent acting J within the scope of his authority. Lee and Honoré

1988 (1) SA p321

A The South African Law of Obligations 2nd ed at 54 para 160 (i) and (ii); Wessels Law of Contract in South Africa 2nd ed vol I at 65 - 6 para 239, including n 49, as to making a communication, or receiving a communication, through an agent; vol II at 611 - 14; Voet 46.3.1, 2 and 4 (translation by Gane vol VII at 93 - 7). Notice received by the servant, if authorised to do so, would be notice to the principal, the first B respondent. The duty of a servant is to further the affairs and the interests of his master, doing so competently and...