Du Randt v Du Randt

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Court: Eastern Cape Division
• Judge: Mullins J, Kroon J and Cooper J
• Judgment Date: 15 March 1991
• Citation: 1992 (3) SA 281 (E)
• Hearing Date: 12 December 1990

Mullins J:

This was an appeal to the Full Bench of this Division brought as a matter of urgency at the request of the parties. The history of the B matter, as appears from the papers before us, is as follows.

The appellant is the father of the respondent. The appellant had various business and farming properties and other business interests. He decided to donate such properties and businesses to the respondent, and registration of transfer of the properties into the name of respondent was duly effected. Appellant alleges however that such donation was subject to C the verbal agreement between himself and respondent that appellant would retain the life usufruct of the said properties and businesses, and that all income therefrom would accrue to appellant during his lifetime. There were other alleged stipulations, the details of which are not important for purposes of this appeal.

During 1990 dissension arose between appellant and respondent. D Respondent denied that appellant had any right of usufruct over his former assets, and he claimed the right to deal therewith, and to enjoy the income therefrom, despite appellant's threat to seek to set aside the donation on the ground of ingratitude, and to establish his usufructuary claim by way of action.

E Respondent's persistence in his denial of the rights claimed by appellant led to an urgent application by appellant for an order restraining respondent from interfering in his enjoyment of the various business and farming activities or from disposing thereof, and ancillary relief.

The matter was heard by Zietsman J (as he then was) who on 27 September F 1990 issued an order in the following terms:

'1.

Dat 'n tussentydse bevel uitreik hangende die aanhoor en finalisering van hierdie aansoek:

(A)

Wat die respondent belet om:

(a)

applikant vanaf die perseel van die applikant se besigheid bekend as Foremost Bottle Store uit te sit of enigsins met G sodanige besigheid in te meng;

(b)

met die applikant se vrye gebruik van die garage te Markplein 27, Adelaide, in te meng;

(c)

op enige wyse met die applikant se vrye gebruik van die perseel H van die besigheid bekend as Goodhope Distributors te Markstraat 27, Adelaide, insluitende toegang tot die toilet en waskamers, in te meng;

(d)

op enige wyse met die applikant se vrye toegang tot die plase bekend as Cowie Neck en Mount Pleasant geleë in die distrik van Adelaide in te meng;

(e)

enige van die bestaande geboue op die plaas Mount Pleasant te I sloop of enigsins te verander;

(f)

enige van die applikant se plaasimplemente en voertuie op die plaas Mount Pleasant te gebruik of enigsins daarmee te handel;

(g)

die volgende eiendomme te verkoop of verder te verpand of op J enige wyse te beswaar:

Mullins J

(i)

A die plaas bekend as Cowie Neck;

(ii)

die plaas bekend as Mount Pleasant;

(iii)

die geboue geleë te hoek van Mitchell en Hiberniastrate, George.

(h)

die volgende items van huisraad te verkoop, te verpand of enigsins te beswaar naamlik:

(i)

B een antieke slaapkamerstel bestaande uit twee hangkaste, 'n dubbelbed en marmer laaikas wat tans in die besit van die respondent is;

(ii)

'n antieke slaapkamerstel bestaande uit twee antieke beddens en 'n spieëlkas wat tans in die besit van die respondent is; C

(iii)

een Sheraton stoel wat tans in die besit van die respondent is;

(iv)

een antieke tafel met boogpootjies wat tans in die besit van die respondent is.

(B)

D Dat die respondent toegelaat word om die boerderybedrywighede op die plase bekend as Mount Pleasant en Cowie Neck in die distrik van Adelaide, te beheer, met dien verstande, dat die respondent alle redelike stappe sal neem om die gesondheid, veiligheid en welvaart van die lewende hawe op die plase te verseker.

(C)

Dat die respondent verbied word om enige van die lewende hawe op E die bovermelde plase enigsins te vervreem, verpand of op enige ander wyse te beswaar.

(D)

Dat die huurgelde ten opsigte van die persele in die gebou geleë te hoek van Hiberniastraat en Mitchellstraat, George, ingevorder word deur en inbetaal word in trust by prokureurs Whitesides, F Highstraat, Grahamstad, en dat die plaasvolk op bovermelde twee plase uit hierdie bedrag betaal word.

2.

Dat die aansoek uitgestel word tot 18 Oktober 1990 vir verhoor en dat respondent sy antwoordende eedsverklarings, indien enige, voor 12 middag op 5 Oktober 1990 liasseer en dat die applikant sy repliserende eedsverklarings, indien enige, liasseer voor 12 middag op 12 Oktober G 1990.

3.

Dat die bevel by ooreenkoms toegestaan word sonder enige erkenning dat applikant geregtig is op enige van die regshulp wat aangevra is.

4.

Dat koste van die uitstel voorbehou word.'

H Although not specifically described as a rule nisi, the interim order had that effect.

The respondent thereafter filed answering affidavits, and after hearing argument Kannemeyer JP (as he then was), in a judgment delivered on 29 November 1990, set aside the aforesaid interim order with costs. His reasons for so ordering are also not relevant for purposes of this appeal. I Suffice it to say that the judgment is based on the legal ground that the alleged verbal usufruct was invalid, and that it should have been in writing.

The appellant thereupon made application for leave to appeal against the order of Kannemeyer JP setting aside the interim order. As Kannemeyer JP J was not available to hear the application for leave to

Mullins J

A appeal, it came before Jones J. In seeking leave to appeal, the present appellant also claimed that, if leave to appeal was granted, the original interim order by Zietsman J would be automatically revived, thereby protecting the appellant pending the hearing of the appeal against Kannemeyer JP's setting aside of such interim order. This view was opposed by the respondent. B

After hearing argument, Jones J on 12 December 1990 made the following order:

'1(a) The applicant is given leave to appeal to the Full Bench of this Division against the judgment of Kannemeyer JP dated 29 November 1990 in case No 1542/90.

(b) C The costs of the application for leave to appeal will be costs in the appeal.

(c) The interim interdict dated 27 September 1990 will not operate pending the outcome of the appeal.'

I should mention that, in the order subsequently issued by the Registrar, D the above paras 1(a), (b) and (c) were numbered 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

This decision was immediately met by a further application by the appellant for leave to appeal against para 1(c) of the last-mentioned order. This resulted in a further judgment by Jones J on 12 December 1990 in which he granted leave to appeal to the Full Bench of this Division against the declaration made in the said para 1(c), the costs of the E application to be costs in the appeal.

Because of the urgency of this matter, a Full Bench was immediately convened, and the matter was argued before us. After hearing argument, we made the following order:

'The appeal is allowed with costs. Paragraph 1(c) of the order of F Mr Justice...