Current Development: Regulatory Capture and Geopolitical Resistance: Analysing State Behaviour in UN Negotiations on Private Military and Security Company Oversight

• Citation: (2024) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 95
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.47348/AYIH/2024/a4
• Published date: 19 May 2026
• Pages: 95-119
• Author: Spentzouris, B.P.
• Date: 19 May 2026

95

Regulatory Capture and Geopolitical

Resistance: Analysing State Behaviour

in UN Negotiations on Private

Military and Security Company

Oversight

By Penny Spentzouris*

ABS TRACT

The Open-e nded Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Private

Military and Secur ity Companies represents a crit ical juncture in internation al

law, where regulatory failure has become institut ionalised through systematic bad

faith negotiation. Since 2017, the Working Group has produced four successive

draft instrume nts, yet it remains deadlocked, not due to technical disagreem ent

but due to calculated obstr uction by powerful states protect ing a US$240 billion

industry. This art icle advances three interconnected argume nts substantiated

through track changes analysis of the Third Rev ised Draft (March 2024) and

Fourth Revised Draft ( March 2025): (1) state opposition correlates directly w ith

national PMSC market dominance, with h ome states (USA, UK, China, South

Africa, Turkey, Russia) controlling 70% of the global market systematically

objecting to substantive accou ntability provisions; (2) the sophistication

of obstructioni st tactics, from def‌initional nar rowing to jurisdictional

fragmentation, reve als regulatory capture through docume nted revolving door

dynamics betwee n government off‌icial s and corporate interests; (3) the distinction

between home states (where PMSCs are regi stered) and host states (where they

operate) explains voting pattern s, with host states predominantly in the Global

South consistently championing binding frameworks while bearing the human

cost of PMSC violations spanning Mali, Central Afr ican Republic, Mozambique

and Sudan. Voluntary frame works, including the Montreux Document and

the International Co de of Conduct Association, have systemat ically failed to

prevent violations or e nsure accountability. The evidence present ed, comprising

economic data correlating ma rket share with negotiating positions, comparative

analysis of state positions on analogous regulat ory frameworks, docume nted

PMSC violations enabled b y accountability gaps, and academic consensu s

on state motivations, demon strates that complexity and sovereignt y concerns

* BA LLB PGDip BCom(Hon) LLM MCom Ph D Candidate (Wits); ORC-ID: 000 9-

0007-8893- 0120; Memberof PLA, IRFA, BATSETA; Aff‌iliate Member of CISA;

Associate Member ofIISAandIRMSA;M Inst D ofIODSA. Email: spentzou risp@

gmail.co m

https://doi.org/10.47348/AYIH/2024/a4

A rican Yearbook HL (2024) Journal indb 95 2026/04/21 16 24

(2024) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 95

© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd

96 AFRICAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

https://doi.org/10.47348/AYIH/2024/a4

cannot explain the systematic pat tern of Western obstruct ion spanning eight

years. The choice before the inter national community is binar y and urgent:

binding regulation prior itising human rights over corporate prof‌its, or cont inued

accommodation of systemat ic violations. This arti cle argues for the exposure of

hidden agendas, alternat ive regulatory pathways through regional frame works

and domestic legislation wit h extraterritorial reach, and pr ioritisation of victim

compensation over state prot ection of corporate interests.

Keywor ds: Private Militar y and Security Companies, U N Working

Group, International Regulation, Corporate Accountability, Human

Rights, Regulatory Capture

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The OEIGWG crisis of legitimacy

The Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) represents one

of the most protracted and contentious regulatory negotiations in

contemporary international law. Established by UN Human Rights

Council resolution 36/11 in 2017, with its mandate renewed by

resolutions 45/16 (2020) and 54/11 (2023), the Working Group has

produced four successive draft instr uments, yet remains mired in

systematic disagreement over fundamental regulatory principles.1

Theevolution from the Third Revised D raft (March 2024)2 to the Fou rth

Revised Draft (March 2025)3 reveals persistent gaps that transcend

technic al legal conside rations and exp ose deeper ideo logical, economic

and geopolit ical fault lines.

Dr Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito’s statement to the Sixth Session in

April 2025 articulated the Working Group’s growing frustration with

the ‘loophole exploitation by PMSC operations’ and the inadequacy of

1 UN Human Rig hts Council Resolution 36/11 (2017), available at <htt ps: //

ap.ohchr.org/docum ents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/ HRC/RES/36/11> (accessed on

17 Feb 2026); UN Human R ights Council Resolution 45/16 (2020) available

at <http s://docs.un.org/e n/A/HRC/res /45/16> (accessed on 17 Feb 2026); UN

Human Rights Cou ncil Resolution 54/11 (2023) available at <ht tps ://do cs .

un.org/en/A/HRC/RES/54/11> (accessed on 17 February 2026).

2 Third Revise d Draft (March 2 024), available at

default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/

LegallyBindi ngInstrumentTNCs_ OBEs.pdf> (accessed on 17 Feb 2026).

3 Fourth Revis ed Draft (March 202 5), available at

default/f‌iles/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/igwg-military/session6/IGWG-

PMSCs-Revised-four th-draft-PMSCs -clean-version-copy.pdf> (accessed on

17February 2026 ).

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© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd