Constitutional interpretation in the socalled ‘hard cases' : revisiting S v Makwanyane

• Pages: 1-17
• Author: Abraham Klaasen
• DOI: 10.10520/EJC-8d7481547
• Published date: 01 July 2017
• Date: 01 July 2017
• Record Number: dejure_v50_n1_a2

1

Constitutional interpretation in the so-

called ‘hard cases’: Revisiting

S v Makwanyane

Abraham Klaasen

BProc LLM LLD

Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, North West University

OPSOMMING

Grondwetlike interpretasie in sogenaamde ‘moeilike sake’: ’n Herbesoek aan

S v Makwanyane

Grondwetlike interpretasie in sogenaamde ‘moeilike sake’ verg, in sekere

gevalle, dat regters van subjektiewe maatstawe moet gebruik maak om

definisie te verskaf aan grondwetlike regte en waardes. Dit beteken dat

regters van nie-tradisionele bronne gebruik moet maak wanneer

grondwetlike interpretasie plaasvind. Dit laat die moontlikheid dat die

bevinding van die hof beïnvloed kan word, of selfs baseer mag wees, op

die persoonlike geloof-, politieke- of waardesisteem van die regter. In S v

Makwanyane, ’n voorbeeld van ’n moeilike saak, het die hof bevind dat

subjektiewe interpretasie onontbeerlik deel is van grondwetlike

interpretasie. Subjektiewe interpretasie is egter moeilik inaggenome die

plig wat op howe rus om ’n beredeneerde rede vir hul beslissings te

verskaf. Hierdie artikel stel voor dat regters die effek van eie persoonlike

vooroordele moet ondersoek en indien dit moontlik ’n rol mag speel in die

beslissing van die hof dit te erken. So erkenning word dan geartikuleer in

die beslissing van die hof wat ’n mate van objektiwiteit daaraan verskaf en

dit blootstel vir kommentaar en moontlike kritiek.

1Introduction

In most cases commonly before the courts, the legal sources point to a

clearly defined outcome after the facts and legal arguments have been

heard. The sources of law that the judge must interpret to arrive at a just

and fair conclusion are obvious. If the plaintiff in a delictual claim for

damages proved, by fact and legal argument, that the defendant has

assaulted him intentionally and unlawfully, he is entitled to the damages

that he can prove. The legal sources point in one direction: a delict was

committed and the plaintiff is entitled to damages. Therefore, there is

conformity in the objective legal interpretation of the sources. However,

adjudication is also sought in matters where the accepted sources of law

are not always clear, may contradict one another, or may offer no clear

and acceptable legal sources for the resolution of the dispute. These are

referred to as ‘hard cases’, in which an objective way of reaching a

judgment based on the accepted sources of law is problematic.

How to cite: Klaasen ‘Constitutional interpretation of the so-called ‘hard cases’: Revisiting S v Makwanyane’

2017 De Jure 1-17

http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2017/v50n1a1

2 2017 De Jure

In South Africa, the first source for judicial decision-making will be the

Constitution,1 followed by the accepted current law in the form of

statutory law, common law, customary law; as well as court precedent,

international, and foreig n law.2 However, in hard cases, the court will

often have to reach a fair and just decision based on other sources. In

some instances, these ‘other sources’ find their origin in the subjective

identity of the judge – the sum of his or her upbringing, culture, life

experience and religious- or political beliefs. However, this presents a

conundrum, as the courts are duty-bound to give reasoned decisions.3

The decision-maker, therefore, has to deliberate before reaching a

decision - and justify the decision made. This means the decision of the

court should be based on fact and sound reason, as well as being well-

founded in prevailing law. It must present a just appraisal of the facts,

evidence and arguments placed before the courts. This requires the judge

to make the reasoning for the decision public in the form of a written

court decision, which articulates the reasoning behind the decision.

This paper investigates the interpretation of the often vague and

undefined constitutional rights and values fundamental to the South

African Constitution by revisiting S v Makwanyane.4 Makwanyane was

chosen because the Court had to deal with the undefined rights and

values articulated by the Interim Constitution.5

Makwanyane is an example of a ‘hard case’ due to its extremely

difficult interpretive choices. The drafters of the Constitutio n and the

incumbent government left the resolution of the question of the

constitutionality of the death penalty up to the courts. The text of the

Interim Constitution offered no guidance and section 11 was unqualified,

stating that everyone has the right to life. The general limitation

provisions of section 36 stated that rights could be limited, but there was

no previous precedent or comparable South African jurisprudence to

guide the adjudication.

The analysis shows that the original Constitutional Court followed a

method of constitutional interpretation based on traditional methods of

interpretation, as well as a measure of subjective constitutional

interpretation. Interpretation, that is, not based on the traditional sources

of the law. This article investigates how the subjective element in

constitutional interpretation in hard cases can be balanced with the duty

of the courts to give reasoned decisions.

1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the

Constitution).

2 Section 39(1) of the Constitution. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a

court (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.

Hereafter, any reference to ‘current law’ includes these sources.

3Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2015 (2) SA 498

(WCC) para 16.

4 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).

5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.