Competition law and corporate social responsibility : a review of the special responsibility of dominant firms in competition law
Author | Phumudzo S. Munyai |
DOI | 10.17159/2225-7160/2020/v53a18 |
Published date | 01 June 2020 |
Date | 01 June 2020 |
Pages | 267-285 |
Competition law and corporate social responsibility 267
Competition law and corporate social
responsibility: a review of the special
responsibility of dominant firms in
competition law
Phumudzo S. Munyai
LLB LLM LLD
Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, University of Pretoria
SUMMARY
“with great power, comes great responsibility”1
Few concepts aptly captures competition law’s expectations on firms with
substantial market share or market power than ‘with great power, comes
great responsibility’, made popular in American movie Spider Man.2
Although Spider Man helped made the concept popular, its true origin may
be religious teachings and ancient cultural wisdoms. The Bible, King James
Vers io n, warns that “For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be
much required”.3 In African culture, the value or principle of Ubuntu, with its
emphasis on common humanity and good, counsels that one person
should not thrive at the expense, or to the exclusion, of others.
The relevance and application of these principles or values to commercial
relationships and rules of trade regulation, in particular competition law, is
the object of this paper. In some competition law jurisdictions, abuse of
dominance rules recognise, explicitly or impliedly, that firms with
substantial market share or market power have a special ‘duty’ or
‘responsibility’ to the market.4 The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the link between certain elements of this special duty or responsibility and
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”).5 It is the argument of this paper
that the principle of special responsibility, as applied in competition and
abuse of dominance law, has elements of CSR.
1 Lee & Ditko Amazing Fantasy No. 15: Spider Man (1962) 13.
2 Adapted from Lee & Ditko 13.
3The Holy Bible, Luke 12:48.
4Michelin v Commission Case No. C-322/81. Wood “EU Competition Law and
the Internet: Present and Past Cases” 2011 Competition Law International
44; Szyszczak “Controlling Dominance in European Markets” 2010
Fordham International Law Journal 1755.
5 It is the assumption of this paper that the reader has some basic knowledge
of what CSR entails as CSR is already a popular concept in business and
legal culture. However, for the sake of completeness, a brief explanation of
CSR will be provided in discussion that will follow. Because it is not the
main object of this paper to provide a full exposition of what CSR entails, it
is recommended that appropriate sources on what CSR entails be
consulted, see Agudelo, Jóhannsdóttir & Davídsdóttir “A literature review of
the history and evolution of corporate social responsibility” 2019
International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility 1.
How to cite: Munyai ‘Competition law and corporate social responsibility: a review of the special
responsibility of dominant firms in competition law’ 2020 De Jure Law Journal 267-285
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2020/v53a18
268 2020 De Jure Law Journal
1Introduction
It is generally accepted that the main or primary goal of competition
law is to promote competition.6 Competition entails the existence of
commercial rivalry among different sellers of the same or similar services
or products striving to win custom. Competition, and the pursuit thereof,
is the ultimate antithesis of monopoly.7 One of the likely outcomes of
competition is that one seller may gain more custom than others, while
others may have to make do with little or no custom. In worst case
scenario, those with little or no custom may be forced to exit the market.
In this context, the difficult question for competition law, and indeed
its main paradox, is what must the law do to ensure that competition in
the market is maintained? Put differently, when one seller emerges
victorious from the competitive struggle, what is the role of competition
law and its enforcement agencies in the market and towards the
emergent dominant firm specifically? To maintain a healthy competitive
balance in the market, can competition law and its enforcement agencies
require or expect the successful and thus dominant firm, once victorious,
to start “pulling its competitive punches”8 in order to “leave a certain
amount of money on the table”9 for other competitors in the market so
as to avoid destroying competition?
Competition policy and law makers recognise that while the free
market system is still a reliable mechanism for the allocation of
resources, they also accept that in appropriate circumstances there may
be justification for intervention in markets, particularly where such
markets have failed or where they do not allocate resources more
efficiently. Markets characterised by monopoly or firms with substantial
market share are a good example of markets with poor and undesirable
resource allocation. Competition law provides a mechanism to control
the actions of monopolies and firms with substantial market share. The
6 Brassey et al Competition Law (2002) 2.
7 This is consistent with the view that the origin and development of
competition law had its roots in the widespread hostility that existed
towards monop oly, Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States 221 US 1
1911 77-82; United States v Aluminium Company of America 148 F2d 416 2d
Cir 1945 427-429; United States v Columbia Steel Co 334 US 495 1948 536.
Orbach “How Antitrust Lost its Goal” 2013 Fordham Law Review 2254;
Bradley, Jr. “On the Origins of the Sherman Act” 1990 Cato Journal 737-738;
Fox “Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the
European Community: Efficiency Opportunity and Fairness” 1986 Notre
Dame Law Review 983; Letwin Law and Economic Policy in America
(1967)15, 54 and 59; Thorelli The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an
American Tradition (1954) 1–5.
8Goldwasser v Ameritech Corp 222 F.3d 390 7th Cir. 2000 397-398. US
Department of Justice Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (2008) 8.
9Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa
Ltd and Another Case No 13/CR/FEB04 para 131.
To continue reading
Request your trial