Battered woman syndrome: Some reflections on the utility of this 'syndrome' to South African women who kill their abusers

• Jurisdiction: South Africa
• Author: Managay Reddi
• Date: 16 August 2019
• Pages: 259-278
• Published date: 16 August 2019
• Citation: (2005) 18 SACJ 259

Battered woman syndrome: Some

ref‌l ections on the utility of this

‘syndrome’ to South African

women who kill their abusers

MANAGAY REDDI*

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to critically examine the concept of the ‘battered woman

syndrome’ a ‘syndrome’ that was coined to describe the experiences of women

who live in abusive relationships. The article explores the possibility that the

extensive body of knowledge that exists concerning battering and its effects

cannot be adequately ref‌l ected by the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ and

that the plight of abused women who kill their abusers would be better served

by the use of social framework evidence instead. The article also articulates the

South African requirements of the defences of self defence, automatism and

lack of criminal capacity arising from non-pathological causes and assesses

the impact if any of ‘battered woman syndrome’ evidence on these defences.

The validity of the view that the current South African law adequately serves

the needs of battered women is also investigated.

Introduction

Law is dynamic. It evolves to keep pace with the demands of society. One

of the demands of society has been the need to arrest the ubiquitous abuse

of women.1 States have been called upon to take special cognisance of this

pandemic of domestic violence which is unencumbered by issues of race,

class or age.2 Most jurisdictions throughout the world, including South

Africa, have responded to the call by creating legislation aimed not only

at protecting women from domestic abuse but also at securing for them a

status commensurate to that enjoyed by all other citizens.3

259

*BA, LLB(UDW), LLM(UN), LLD(UDW). Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law,

University of KwaZulu-Natal.

1Studies conducted on the prevalence of domestic violence indicate that it is widespread

in heterosexual relationships and unaffected by ethnic, cultural or economic distinctions

between women. See Justice for Women ‘Battered women’s syndrome: Help or hindrance?’

available at http//www.jfw.org.uk/BWS.HTM.

2For instance, in 1976 the attention of the world was drawn to the violent plight of women

at the Brussels meeting of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women. See

B Jacobson (1977) The Civil Rights Digest 3.

3In South Africa for instance, the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 tries to alleviate the

plight of abused persons by providing protection against family violence. See also the

(2005) 18 SACJ 259

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260 SACJ • (2005) 3

Despite these commendable protections, it is a trite fact that women

continue to be abused at an alarming rate.4 Even more alarming is the

fact that many abused woman, worldwide, remain in abusive relationships.

Women’s rights activists and women’s advocates have over the years

sought to f‌i nd reasons to understand this anomaly – hence the advent of

the ‘battered woman syndrome’.

‘Battered woman syndrome’ is not and has never been a legal defence in

its own right.5 The term ‘battered woman syndrome’ is used to describe

a pattern of psychological and behavioural symptoms found in women

living in violent relationships. It is, however, a term that is widely

misunderstood even among legal professionals who mistakenly believe it

to refer to a legal defence. ‘Battered woman syndrome’ is simply a legal

defence strategy that is used to explain a battered woman’s experiences.

Battering and its effects are of particular relevance to criminal trials in

two respects: f‌i rst, when a battered woman is being tried for a crime and

introduces a defence of self-defence, automatism, or lack of capacity; and

secondly, when a battered woman has been charged or convicted of a

crime, and evidence of battering or its effects is adduced to mitigate the

gravity of the charge or the severity of the sentence.

This article seeks to critically examine the concept of the ‘battered

woman syndrome’. It explores the possibility that the comprehensive

body of knowledge that exists concerning battering and its effects cannot

be adequately ref‌lected by the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ and

that the cause of abused women would be better served by the use of

social framework evidence instead. The article also articulates the South

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 which secures the position

of women through various germane sections, namely, ss 9 (right to equality), 10 (right

to human dignity), 11 (right to life), 12 (right to freedom and security of the per son), 13

(right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude and forced labour), 14 (right to privacy) and

15(1) (right to freedom of thought, belief, opinion, conscience and religion). In the United

States, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and the Violence

Against Women Act of 1994 attempt to mitigate the dilemma of abused women. In the

United Kingdom, the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act of 1976 offers a

certain measure of succour to abused women.

4One of the most comprehensive studies on the prevalence of domestic violence, conducted

by Statistics Canada in the early 1990s, involving 12 300 women found that one in three

women experience violence in a heterosexual relationship. These results replicate those

documented in a North London study conducted in 1994 by researcher Jane Mooney.

See Justice for Women ‘Battered women’s syndrome: Help or hindrance?’ available at

http//www.jfw.org.uk/BWS.HTM.

5In the Canadian and American contexts, for instance, ‘battered woman syndrome’ evidence

forms part of the broad ‘social framework’ or ‘social context’ evidence that is led in order

to assist the judge and jury to make their f‌i ndings in cases in which the defence of self-

defence is raised. See for instance R v Malott [1998] 1 SCR 123; 155 DLR (4th) 513 and

Commonwealth v Haddock 46 Mass App Ct 246, 249-250 n4 (1999). See also People v

Romero 13 Cal Rptr 2d 332, 336 (Cal App 2d Dist 1992).

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